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For a considerable period of time, sea carriers have benefitted from 
the notion of “freedom of contract” when it comes to contracts 
concerning carriage of passengers by sea in international voyages. The 
legal position has changed dramatically when the international 
community devised a regime (the Convention relating to the Carriage of 
Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, also known as the Athens 
Convention 1974) establishing a minimum degree of protection for 
passengers. The Athens Convention, amended in 2002, not only applies 
in jurisdictions which have incorporated it into their legal system but can 
also be contractually made part of carriage contracts, which is often the 
case as far as the cruise industry is concerned. The purpose of this article 
is to evaluate the extent to which the Athens regime serves the needs of 
passengers in the twenty first century. To this end, problematic aspects of 
the Athens regime have been identified and evaluated in the light of the 
solutions adopted in the context of international regimes regulating 
carriage of passengers by air in international voyages. As a result of this 
analysis, it is intended: i) to provide guidance to courts in different 
jurisdictions on how to deal with problematic aspects of the Athens 
regime; and ii) to offer insights to governments that are not currently 
parties to the regime but might consider the ratification of the 
Convention as to potential ambiguities that need to be addressed as part 
of the implementing legislation.    
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I. INTRODUCTION
Contrary to international developments that other modes of transport 
have witnessed,1 freedom of contract has been the dominant method of 
regulating the carriage of passengers by sea until the latter half of the 
twentieth century. However, an international approach intending to offer 
a minimum degree of protection to passengers carried by sea has 
gradually prevailed after a number of unsuccessful attempts made in 
1960s2 to devise such an international liability regime. Finally, the 
international community succeeded, in its third attempt, to devise an 
international regime that provides a basic legal framework for passengers 
carried on international sea voyages with the adaptation of the 
* Director of the Institute of International Shipping and Trade Law, Swansea University,
United Kingdom. 
** Member of the Institute of International Shipping and Trade Law, Swansea 
University, United Kingdom.     
1 For example, an international liability regime in relation to air passengers was 
established as early as 1929. See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
Relating to International Carriage by Air art. 1, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 
L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter WC]. The Warsaw regime underwent substantial modifications 
in the years to follow, most notably in 1955 and 1961, and the entire web of instruments 
was codified into one instrument in 1999. See Convention for the Unification of Certain 
Rules for International Carriage by Air, May 28, 1999, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309 (colloquially 
known as the Montreal Convention) [hereinafter MC]. The Uniform Rules Concerning 
the Contract of International Carriage of Passengers by Rail, which is an appendix to the 
Convention Concerning International Carriage by Rail, May 9, 1980, 1397 U.N.T.S. 76, 
performs a similar function for passengers carried on international voyages. See Uniform 
Rules Concerning the Contract of International Carriage of Passengers by Rail, INT’L
RAIL TRANSP. COMM. (June 9, 1999), https://www.cit-rail.org/secure-
media/files/documentation_de/passenger/civ/civ1999-f-d-e.pdf?cid=21961. This 
Convention has its roots in the late nineteenth century and has been revised a number of 
times since then.  
2. See International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
the Carriage of Passengers by Sea, Apr. 29, 1961, 1411 U.N.T.S. 87 (This Convention 
entered into force on June 1965, but with very few ratifications. Only Algeria, Cuba, 
France, Iran, Madagascar, Morocco, Peru, Switzerland, Tunisia, United Arab Republic 
and Zaire ratified this Convention); International Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules Regulation to Carriage of Passenger Luggage at Sea [May 1967] (never 
entered into force). 
486 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 26.3  
Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by 
Sea on 13 December 1974 (Athens Convention 1974).3  
It is an overstatement to suggest that the Athens Convention 1974 has 
received worldwide approval, in particular in comparison with 
conventions designed to perform a similar function for passengers 
carried by other modes of transport.4 However, it is true to say that it has 
been incorporated into the legal systems of more than 30 countries from 
all around the world.5  
In a nutshell, the liability of the carrier is subject to a fault-based 
regime under the Athens Convention 1974. When the death of a 
passenger, injury to a passenger, or the loss of or damage to his cabin 
luggage arises from a non-shipping incident, also known as a hotel type 
incident, the passenger has to prove a causal connection between the 
incident and the damage, as well as actual fault attributable to the carrier 
in order to establish liability of the carrier and recover.6 When, on the 
other hand, the death of a passenger, injury to a passenger, or the loss of 
or damage to his/her cabin luggage arises from a shipping incident, the 
  
 3. See Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their 
Luggage by Sea, Dec. 13, 1974, 1463 U.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Athens Convention 1974]. 
It would be wrong to deem this Convention as a consumer protection tool. The 
Convention regime goes much further than that and establishes a liability regime for 
certain types of claims that passengers can bring at the same time, allowing the carrier to 
limit their liability in monetary terms and defend claims on the basis of time bar 
restrictions.         
 4. As of April 2018 the MC has been ratified by 131 member states. Convention 
for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Air Carriage by Air Done at 
Montreal 1999, 1–3, 
https://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/Mtl99_EN.pdf. 
 5. As of June 2017, the member states are: Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, 
China, Congo, Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Georgia, Guyana, Jordan, 
Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Malawi, Nigeria, Poland, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Switzerland, Tonga, Ukraine, Vanuatu, Yemen, Hong Kong-China (as 
associated member) and Macau-China (as associated member). Status of Conventions, 
INT’L MAR. ORG., 
http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2018). The Athens Convention regime has been incorporated, 
sometimes with higher limits, into the national laws of some states, such as Canada and 
Vietnam, even though these states have not officially ratified the convention. Id. It should 
be noted that several states have recently denounced Athens Convention 1974 and ratified 
the 2002 version of the Convention. 
 6. See Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 3(1)–(2). 
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burden of proof shifts from the passenger to the carrier.7 In such cases, 
the carrier is presumed to be at fault and, to avoid liability, must prove 
that it took all necessary precautions to avoid the accident.8 The carrier’s 
fault is also presumed in respect of loss of or damage to luggage, other 
than cabin luggage, irrespective of the nature of the incident from which 
the loss or damage resulted.9 The Athens Convention 1974 allows 
carriers to limit their liability,10 although the limits are generally regarded 
as low (i.e., for personal injury and death claims the limit is set at 46,666 
Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) per passenger).11 The Convention also 
establishes that any action for damages arising out of the death of or 
personal injury to a passenger or for the loss of or damage to luggage 
shall be time-barred after a period of two years.12 It also provides 
passengers a number of alternative jurisdictions to bring an action arising 
under the Athens Convention 1974, provided that the court is located in a 
State that is a Party to this Convention.13
In an attempt to improve the rights of passengers under the Athens 
Convention 1974 and make the regime a more attractive proposition in 
terms of ratifications, the Protocol of 2002 to the Athens Convention14
(Athens Convention 2002) was adopted in a diplomatic conference in 
London.15 The Athens Convention 2002 introduces a compulsory 
7. A “ship related incident” has been defined in Athens Convention 1974 as an
incident arising from or in connection with the shipwreck, collision, stranding, explosion 
or fire, or defect in the ship. Id. art. 3(3). 
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See id. arts. 7–8.
11. See id.
12. Id. art. 16.
13. Id. art. 17; see generally FRANCESCO BERLINGIERI, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME
CONVENTIONS: THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS AND PASSENGERS BY SEA 259–93 (2014) 
(providing a more comprehensive review of the Athens regime). 
14. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Protocol of 2002 to the Athens Convention
Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, 1974, LEG/CONF. 
13/20 (Nov. 19, 2002), http://folk.uio.no/erikro/WWW/corrgr/dipcon/20.pdf [hereinafter 
Athens Convention 2002].
15. See generally Baris Soyer, Sundry Considerations on the Draft Protocol to
the Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage at Sea 
1974, 33 J. MAR. L. & COM. 519 (2002); Erik Røsæg, News Under the Athens Sun – New 
Principles and Lost Opportunities of the Athens Convention 2002, 46 SCANDINAVIAN L.
154 (2004); Robert D. Peltz, The Athens Convention Revisited, 43 J. MAR. L. & COM. 491
(2012). 
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insurance regime and allows direct actions against insurers.16 Most 
importantly, the Athens Convention 2002 has also introduced 
fundamental changes to the liability regime.17 The new regime provides 
for a two-tiered liability system for a passenger’s death or personal injury 
caused by shipwreck, capsizing, collision, stranding; explosion or fire in 
the ship; or defect in the ship.18 In the first tier, the carrier is strictly liable 
up to 250,000 SDRs,19 unless the carrier proves that the accident was 
caused solely by an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection, or an 
exceptional natural phenomenon.20 Similarly, the carrier would be 
exempted from liability were it to prove that the incident was wholly 
caused by an act or omission of a third party with the intent to cause the 
incident.21 In the second tier, (i.e., above the strict liability limit), the 
carrier is liable unless it can prove that the incident causing the loss 
occurred without its fault or neglect.22 Therefore, a reversed burden of 
proof is imposed on the carrier for losses between 250,000 SDRs and 
400,000 SDRs (i.e., the maximum liability expressed in the amended 
Article 7 of the Athens Convention 1974).23 The Athens Convention 
2002 does not make any change in the liability regime for personal injury 
and death claims arising out of non-ship related incidents. For such 
claims, the claimant must still prove that the carrier’s negligence has led 
to personal injury or death.24  
  
 16. See Athens Convention 2002, supra note 14, art. 4bis. 
 17. See id. art. 3.         
 18. See id. art. 3(5). 
 19. Id. art. 4bis (stating the carrier is required to obtain compulsory insurance in 
respect of the death of and personal injury to passengers up to this figure). 
 20. See Athens Convention 2002, supra note 14, art. 3(1). 
 21. Id. art. 4(1)(b). Similar exceptions appear in other conventions adopting a 
strict liability regime. See, e.g., International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage art. 3(2)(b), Nov. 27, 1992, 1956 U.N.T.S 286; International 
Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage 
of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea art. 7(2)(b), May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1406 
(not yet in force). 
 22. See Athens Convention 2002, supra note 14, art. 4(b). 
 23. See id. The other main changes that have been brought about by the protocol 
are: an increase of 25 percent on luggage claims; allowing the court seized to suspend the 
operation or interrupt the running of the two-year time limit; and the possibility for 
regional integration organisations, such as the EU to sign the new Convention with the 
same rights and obligations as a nation state. Id. arts. 8–9, 19. 
 24. Soyer, supra note 15, at 524. 
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The Athens Convention 2002 entered into force on April 23, 2014,25 
and, perhaps more fundamentally, the European Union (EU) adopted it 
into EU law by virtue of Council Regulation 392/2009 before the 
Convention came into force internationally.26 This Regulation not only 
intends to provide a uniform liability regime for passengers carried by 
sea, but it also extends the scope of application of the Athens Convention 
2002 to domestic carriage and inland waterways.27  
To what extent the Athens Convention 2002 will achieve uniformity 
within the EU through the implementation of this Regulation is 
questionable given that no attempt has been made in the relevant 
Regulation to clarify the uncertainties surrounding certain provisions.28 
However, we do not intend to be involved in a discussion on the potential 
pitfalls of the Council Regulation.29 Our enquiry goes much wider. Our 
objective is to analyse the extent to which the Athens Convention 2002 
provides a sound and reliable liability regime for passengers carried by 
sea. To this end, the meaning and scope of several ambiguous provisions 
  
 25. As of June 2017, the member states to the Athens Convention 2002 are: 
Albania, Belgium, Belize, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Marshall Islands, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Palau, 
Panama, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Syrian Arab 
Republic, United Kingdom and European Union. INT’L MAR. ORG., STATUS OF 
MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE 
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION OR ITS SECRETARY-GENERAL PERFORMS 
DEPOSITARY OR OTHER FUNCTIONS 337 (2017). 
 26. Baris Soyer, Emergence of EU Maritime Law, in A COMPANION TO 
EUROPEAN UNION LAW AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 432, 433 (Dennis Patterson & Anna 
Sὂdersten eds., 2016). 
 27. Council Regulation 392/2009, of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 23 Apr. 2009 on the Liability of Carriers of Passengers by Sea in the Event of 
Accidents, 2009 O.J. (L 131) 24. The Regulation also makes the following major changes 
in this area: 
-removal of the possibility for Member States under the Athens Convention 2002 to fix 
limits of liability higher than those provided for in the Convention (Article 4); 
-making advance payment in the event of the death of, or personal injury to, a passenger 
(Article 5); and 
-providing detailed pre-journey information to passengers (Article 6).    
Id. 
 28. Soyer, Emergence of EU Maritime Law, supra note 26, at 433. 
 29. See generally Baris Soyer, Boundaries of the Athens Convention: What You 
See is not Always What You Get!, in LIABILITY REGIMES IN CONTEMPORARY MARITIME 
LAW 183 (Rhidian D. Thomas ed., 2007). 
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of the Athens Convention 2002 will be evaluated and critically analysed. 
In the course of this analysis, comparisons will be made with the 
international regimes dealing with the liability of air carriers to their 
passengers. The authors are well aware that the international air liability 
regimes have been developed against the backdrop of a different era and 
there are significant differences between these two modes of transport. 
However, it is also undeniable that legal jurisprudence on international 
air liability regimes is fertile. It is feasible that such a comparative 
approach could provide impressive guidance as to how to resolve 
ambiguities in the Athens Convention 2002, especially regarding 
provisions that have general applicability (i.e., provisions not dealing 
with issues unique to sea transport). It is hoped that the article will serve 
the following two objectives: providing guidance to courts in Contracting 
States30 on how to deal with problematic issues and provisions of the 
Athens Conventions; and offering insights to governments (such as 
Australia and Singapore) that are not members to the Athens regime but 
might consider the ratification of the Athens Convention 2002 as to 
potential ambiguities that need to be addressed in the implementing 
legislation.    
Considering that most cruise line terms commonly seek to 
contractually incorporate the provisions of the Athens Convention 1974, 
it is evident that the deliberations in this article could be relevant even in 
jurisdictions (such as the United States of America) that have not 
implemented the Athens regime into their legal system.31 
Before analysing the problematic aspects of the Athens regime in 
Section III, Section II provides an overview of how the liability regime 
in the aviation sector has developed. It highlights the main differences 
with the Athens regime and provides some answers as to why the 
liability regime of the former has developed in a radically different 
fashion.  
  
 30. Contracting states are the states that have become party to the Athens regime. 
 31. The cruise sector is gigantic in North America. In 2016, 12.41 million 
passengers were carried by the North American cruise industry. Number of Guests of the 
Global Cruise Industry from 2007 to 2016, by Source Region, STATISTA, 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/301598/number-of-guests-of-the-global-cruise-
industry-by-region/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2018). This is larger than the total of cruise 
passengers carried in Europe, Australia, and Asia during the same period, which was 
11.84 million. Id. 
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIR 
CARRIAGE REGIME FOR PASSENGERS  
The liability of air carriers for the death or bodily injury of passengers 
sustained during their international carriage by air is regulated by the 
Warsaw Convention System (WCS) and the Montreal Convention 1999 
(MC). 
 
The WCS is a blend of the following international law instruments: 
(i) the original Warsaw Convention 1929 (WC);32  
(ii) the Hague Protocol 1955 amending the WC (WC/HP);33  
(iii) the Guadalajara Convention 1961 supplementing the WC or the 
WC/HP (GC);34  
(iv) the Guatemala City Protocol 1971 (GCP) amending the 
WC/HP;35 and  
(v) the Montreal Additional Protocols Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 of 1975 (MP1, 
MP2, MP3, MP4) amending the WC (MP1), the WC/HP (MP2 and 
MP4) and the GCP (MP3).36  
  
 32. See generally WC, supra note 1. 
 33. See Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
Relating to International Carriage by Air, Mar. 8, 1971, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter 
WC/HP]. 
 34. See Convention Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention for the Unification 
of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person Other 
than the Contracting Carrier, Sept. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 32 (colloquially known as the 
Guadalajara Convention) [hereinafter GC]. 
 35. See Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
Relating to International Carriage by Air, Mar. 8, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 613 [hereinafter GCP]. 
It is noteworthy that the GCP never came into force. SHAHEED FATIMA, USING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC COURTS 176 (2005). 
 36. See Additional Protocol No. 1 to Amend Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Sept. 25, 1975, ICAO Doc. 9145 
[hereinafter MP1]; Additional Protocol No. 2 to Amend the Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Sept. 25, 1975, 
ICAO Doc. 9146 [hereinafter MP2]; Additional Protocol No. 3 to Amend the Convention 
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The MC was the long-awaited reaction to this assortment of laws. It is 
a standalone international convention that gradually replaces the WCS by 
taking over it when all the State Parties of the WCS ratify the MC.37 Its 
overarching aim is to consolidate the liability system governing 
passengers and air carriers into one instrument and modernise it by tilting 
the balance in favour of passengers.38
From the outset, it needs to be stressed that the international liability 
regime for air passengers was developed at a time when the aviation 
sector was going through a trial-and-error learning process. The 
technological mishaps of flying adversely affected passengers and, to a 
lesser extent, innocent bystanders on the ground which inevitably led to 
the adoption of a protectionist approach when developing the WC in the 
1920s.39 This was a time when sea carriers were still enjoying the 
benefits of the traditional freedom of contract that underpinned maritime 
law for centuries.40 This further explains why the liability of air carriers 
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Sept. 25, 
1975, ICAO Doc. 9147 [hereinafter MP3] (The MP3 never came into force following the 
fate of the GCP.); Additional Protocol No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Sept. 25, 1975, 
reprinted in Sec. Rep. No. 105-20 [hereinafter MP4]. 
37. MC, supra note 1, art. 55; see also PAUL S. DEMPSEY & MICHAEL MILDE,
INTERNATIONAL AIR CARRIER LIABILITY: THE MONTREAL CONVENTION 1999 254–55
(2005).
38. See MC, supra note 1, preamble (“RECOGNIZING the significant
contribution of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
International Carriage by Air signed in Warsaw on 12 October 1929, hereinafter referred 
to as the ‘Warsaw Convention’, and other related instruments to the harmonization of 
private international air law; RECOGNIZING the need to modernize and consolidate the 
Warsaw Convention and related instruments; RECOGNIZING the importance of ensuring 
protection of the interests of consumers in international carriage by air and the need for 
equitable compensation based on the principle of restitution; REAFFIRMING the 
desirability of an orderly development of international air transport operations and the 
smooth flow of passengers, baggage and cargo in accordance with the principles and 
objectives of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, done at Chicago on 7 
December 1944; CONVINCED that collective State action for further harmonization and 
codification of certain rules governing international carriage by air through a new 
Convention is the most adequate means of achieving an equitable balance of interests; 
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS” (emphasis added)).
39. See WC, supra note 1; GEORGE LELOUDAS, RISK AND LIABILITY IN AIR LAW
§§ 3.22–.25, 4.17–.24 (2009).
40. See Soyer, Boundaries of the Athens Convention, supra note 29, at 183.
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was based on a presumption of fault under the WC with limited 
contractual exclusions permitted,41 whilst sea carriers could contractually 
exclude or limit their liability against their passengers. It took the 
international community half a century to make sea carriers subject to a 
similar liability regime, providing a minimal degree of protection to sea 
passengers with the introduction of the Athens Convention 1974.42
With air travel becoming part of the mainstream in the Western world 
and the middle classes of Western countries being its main customers by 
the 1980s, the public’s tolerance for technological mishaps causing 
substantial losses of life gradually disappeared.43 Media attention to the 
aftermath of aviation accidents contributed to this tendency as it ensured 
that the international air liability regime was in the spotlight after each 
loss of an aircraft.44 Paradoxically, the insurance sector’s attitude to 
liability issues gradually became more relaxed as accident data on
individual air carriers, airports, routes, and geographical areas of 
operations became easily available.45 Liability insurers began to calculate 
their maximum exposure with accuracy by making use of such data, 
which in turn enabled them to make provisions for losses in terms of 
premium rates and investment return.46 These factors accelerated the 
adoption of a better liability regime for air passengers in the 1990s.47
Under the MC, a two-tiered system of liability was created.48 Air carriers 
are now strictly liable for death or bodily injury caused by accidents that 
take place on board an aircraft or in the process of 
embarkation/disembarkation up to 113,000 SDRs.49 The only defence in 
41. Under the WCS, the claimants had the burden of establishing that (i) there
had been an “accident” which (ii) took place on board the aircraft or during the 
operations of embarking or disembarking and (iii) caused the passenger’s death, or bodily 
injury. WC, supra note 1, art. 17. The burden was then reversed to the carrier to establish 
the two available defences, namely that (i) it has taken all necessary measures to avoid 
the damage or that it was impossible for them to take such measures; or (ii) the 
death/bodily injury was caused by or contributed by the passenger. Id. arts. 20(1)–21. 
42. See Soyer, Boundaries of the Athens Convention, supra note 29, at 183.
43. See LELOUDAS, supra note 39, §§ 3.47–.48.
44. See id. §§ 2.37–.58.
45. See id. §§ 4.134–.152.
46. See id.
47. See id. §§ 4.143–.152.
48. MC, supra note 1, arts. 17, 21.
49. MC, supra note 1, arts. 17, 21(1). Article 24 provides that the limit is to be
reviewed every five years by reference to an inflation factor; if the factor exceeds 10 
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this first tier is to prove that the damage was caused or contributed “by 
the negligence or other wrongful act or omission” of the claimant.50 For 
damages exceeding this amount, the carrier bears unlimited liability and 
has the burden of establishing any of the following three available 
defences: namely, “that the damage was caused by or contributed to by 
the negligence or other wrongful act or omission” of the claimant;51 that 
the “damage was not due to the negligence or other wrongful act or 
omission of the carrier or its servants or agents;”52 or that the damage 
was solely caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of a third 
party.53  
The Athens Convention 2002 introduced a strict liability regime as 
well but only for personal injury and death claims arising from shipping 
incidents.54 Still, sea carriers and, in particular, their liability insurers, 
were not prepared to accept a regime of unlimited liability.55 It is not 
within the realm of this article to elaborate why the sea carriage regime 
has been developed in a more conservative fashion compared to the air 
carriage regime. However, it can be safely said that the following two 
issues in particular were of major concern for liability insurers: the fact 
that a large cruise liner could carry up to 6,000–7,000 passengers;56 and 
that passengers on board ships are likely to be more mobile compared to 
aircraft passengers and, therefore, the risk of a ship’s passengers 
suffering personal injury is significantly greater.57 
However, as indicated above, the fact that aviation has adopted a 
different liability regime to that of sea does not mean that the latter has 
  
percent, the limit will be increased accordingly, unless a majority of State Parties 
disapprove. Id. art. 24. 
 50. See id. art. 20.  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. art. 21(2)(a). 
 53. Id. art. 21(2)(b).  
 54. Athens Convention 2002, supra note 14, art. 4. 
 55. See Soyer, supra note 15, 530–33. 
 56. See, e.g., Richard Tribou, Royal Carribean Oasis of the Seas set for Port 
Canaveral Debut, ORLANDO SENTIENTIAL (Nov. 3, 2016), 
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/travel/florida-cruise-guide/os-royal-caribbean-oasis-of-
the-seas-port-canaveral-debut-2-20161105-story.html (stating that the Oasis of the Seas, 
operated by Royal Caribbean International Ltd, could carry up to 7,144 passengers at 
maximum capacity). 
 57. See Soyer, supra note 15, 530–31. 
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nothing to learn from the former’s development of the law and practice. 
In fact, as illustrated in this Section, the development of the air carriage 
regime has influenced the evolution of the liability regime under both the 
1974 and 2002 Athens Conventions. Therefore, the authors will refer, 
where necessary, to the solutions adopted by the air carriage regimes in 
their quest to identify how the Athens Convention 2002 can be modified 
or interpreted to provide a better global liability regime for passengers 
carried by sea.       
III. ISSUES CONCERNING DEFINITION OF KEY NOTIONS UNDER THE 
ATHENS REGIME 
A) Scope of the Athens Regime 
Under the Athens regime (both the 1974 and 2002 Conventions), the 
Convention is applicable when a contract of carriage is made by or on 
behalf of a carrier for the carriage of a passenger, with or without his 
luggage, on a ship.58 Not surprisingly, the drafters made no attempt to 
define what a contract is, leaving its determination to the national laws of 
the Contracting States. This is likely to create difficulties, especially in 
common law jurisdictions where it is necessary that both parties provide 
consideration for the contract.59 Is there, for example, a contract of 
carriage if a passenger is given a free ticket from the operators of the ship 
as a result of an advertising promotion?60 The legislation incorporating 
the Athens Convention 1974 into United Kingdom (UK) law expressly 
stipulated that “[a]ny reference in the Convention to a contract of 
carriage excludes a contract of carriage which is not for reward.”61 This 
kind of clarification is useful, but problems could still arise in some 
  
 58. Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, arts. 1–2; Athens Convention 2002, 
supra note 14, art. 2 (applying only to international voyages, but Contracting States may 
extend the application of the Convention to domestic voyages). 
 59. See, e.g., Thomas v. Thomas (1842) 114 Eng. Rep. 330, 332; 2 QB 851, 855–
56. 
 60. But see Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of 
Passengers and Luggage by Road art. 1, ¶ 1, Mar. 1, 1973, 1774 U.N.T.S. 109 (describing 
a passenger as “any person who, in the performance of a contract of carriage made by 
him or on his behalf, is carried either for reward or gratuitously by a carrier”). 
 61. Merchant Shipping Act 1995, c. 21, § 182, sch. 6 (Eng.) [hereinafter MSA 
1995]. 
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cases. It is not uncommon practice for ferry operators to issue tickets free 
of charge to youngsters travelling with adults.62 In that case, would the 
ticket issued for the youngster come under the Athens regime? 
Technically the contract is not for reward, but it is also plausible to argue 
that a contract with a youngster is issued only when an adult ticket is 
purchased. In that case, the passenger’s payment for his ticket would 
provide adequate consideration for his contract and the contract of the 
youngster.63  
A problem of this nature is unlikely to arise in the context of the air 
carriage conventions. This is because both the MC and the WCS provide 
that they are applicable to gratuitous carriage performed by an “air 
transport undertaking,” although they do not define the term.64 In the UK, 
the term is currently defined, for regulatory purposes, in the Transport 
Act 2000 as an undertaking that provides “services for the carriage by air 
of passengers or cargo for hire or reward,” a definition that is not 
particularly helpful in our case.65 The following more helpful definition 
was included in the Air Navigation Order 2005 (ANO 2005): “‘Air 
transport undertaking’ means an undertaking whose business includes the 
undertaking of flights for the purpose of the public transport of 
passengers or cargo.”66 However, the term has disappeared from the 
latest ANOs of 2009 and 2016.67 Still, there is no doubt that a 
commercial air carrier would qualify as such and the transport of an 
under-two-year-old for free would trigger the application of the aviation 
conventions. A consensus seems to have developed among courts that to 
be an “air transport undertaking” for the aviation conventions, the 
  
 62. See, e.g., 30% off Ferries to Ireland Plus Kids Go Free, DIRECT FERRIES, 
https://www.directferries.co.uk/news/201706/30_off_ferries_to_ireland_plus_kids_go_fr
ee.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2018). 
 63. Marine Liability Act, S.C. 2001, c 6, art 37(2) (Can.). It is worth noting that 
the Canadian enactment of the Athens Convention extends the application of the 
Convention to all passengers of commercial or public craft carried by water, whether or 
not they are being carried pursuant to a contract. Buhlman v. Buckley, (2011), 330 
D.L.R. 4th 755 (Can. Ont.). However, the Convention would not apply when a visitor 
makes use of a boat for accommodation purposes. Id. at para. 37. 
 64. MC, supra note 1, art. 1(1); WC, supra note 1, art. 1(1). 
 65. Transport Act 2000, c. 38, § 95(5) (UK). 
 66. Air Navigation Order 2005, SI 2005/1970, art. 155, ¶ 19 (UK).  
 67. Air Navigation Order 2009, SI 2009/3015, art. 255 (UK); Air Navigation 
Order 2016, SI 2016/765, arts. 2–7 (UK). 
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relevant entity or person is required to “provide air carriage as part of a 
commercial enterprise even though aviation is not its principal activity”68 
or “even if air transport is only a small or subordinate part of the whole 
business.”69 It has even been suggested that the only flights excluded are 
“casual, isolated flights when a free ride is afforded by an owner not 
engaged in the business (enterprise) of flying.”70  
A more difficult question arises when a pregnant woman sustains 
injuries while she is carried on board a vessel that result in the child 
being later born with disabilities. There is no doubt that under English 
law the child would be able to bring an action against the carrier for 
personal injuries suffered, but it is debatable whether such claim can be 
brought under the Athens regime or a different national legal regime. In 
the UK the claim will fall under the Athens regime if the unborn child is 
carried as a passenger or if he can be viewed as a third party beneficiary 
of a contract under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.71 If 
that course of action fails, a claim by the unborn child could be brought 
under the Congenital Disabilities Act 1976.72 However, any action 
brought under the national legal system will be outside the Athens 
regime,73 which means that the carrier will benefit from global limitation 
figures rather than those set out in the Athens Convention.74 Courts 
  
 68. MONTREAL CONVENTION 1–20 (Elmar Giemulla et al. eds., 2010). 
 69. SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT: AIR LAW, LEAFLET NO. 156, DIVISION VII, ¶ 312 
(David McClean et al. eds., 2017).    
 70. Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323, 333 n.30 (5th Cir. 
1967). 
 71. The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, c. 31, § 1(3) (Eng.) 
(stipulating that “[t]he third party . . . need not be in existence when the contract is 
entered into.”).    
 72. See Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976, c. 28, § 1 (Eng.). 
 73. See Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 14. 
 74. In maritime law, carriers can benefit from global limitation. This essentially 
allows carriers to limit their liability for all claims emerging from an incident. The 
Athens Convention, on the other hand, allows carriers to limit their liability with regard 
to each passenger claim (unit limitation). See generally Athens Convention 1974, supra 
note 3. If a State is party both the Athens Convention and a global limitation regime, such 
as the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, Nov. 19, 1976, 1456 
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter LLMC 1976], if the combined amount of all the claims exceeds 
the fund set by the global limitation regime, all the claims (including passenger claims 
under the Athens Convention) will be reduced proportionately. Protocol of 1996 to 
Amend LLMC 1976, May 2, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1433 allows State parties to make a 
reservation with regard to passenger claims under the Athens Convention (96 art. 
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might, of course, find it unacceptable that a mother who is injured during 
carriage is subjected to a different legal regime than her unborn child 
who is injured as a result of the same incident. Such policy argument 
might encourage them to find that the foetus has the status of a passenger 
under the Convention, but this outcome is far from certain.   
The authors know of no reported cases of this nature under the 
aviation conventions. However, the recent decision of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on Air Baltic Corporation AS75 
might be relevant as it confirmed that a contract of carriage by air can be 
concluded with a third party for the benefit of the actual passenger.76 In 
this case the tickets were paid by the employer but issued in the names of 
its employees, who were the actual passengers transported.77 The air 
carrier was held liable to the employer for damage occasioned by delay 
to the carriage of its employees.78  
Still, it will be an over-stretching of the boundaries of the aviation 
conventions to use this decision to argue that the unborn child is a 
beneficiary of the mother’s contract of carriage. First, case law is clear 
that a passenger, gratuitous or otherwise, must have consented to the 
carriage in question by means of a contract.79 The existence of such 
consent explains why the aviation conventions have been held not to 
apply to “stowaways, persons on the flight to be expelled from the State 
of departure, persons employed by the carrier to carry out routine 
maintenance, flight attendants, and student pilots . . . have not contracted 
for carriage as such.”80 What the CJEU decision seems to suggest is that, 
while it is irrelevant whether the third contracting party is a passenger or 
not, the beneficiary must qualify as a passenger. Secondly, air tickets 
usually bear the name of the passenger and do not permit substitutions or 
  
15bis.3). This means that the limits set by the Athens Convention will not be susceptible 
to further reduction under the global limitation regime.   
 75. See Case C-429/14, Air Baltic Corp. AS v. Lietuvos Respublikos Specialiųjų 
Tyrimų Tarnyba, 2016 E.C.R. 88, 3 C.M.L.R. 1, 1 (2016) [hereinafter Air Baltic 
Corporation AS].   
 76. MONTREAL CONVENTION, supra note 68, at 1–26.   
 77. See Air Baltic Corporation AS, supra note 75, at 12–14. 
 78. See id. at 52.  
 79. MALCOLM A. CLARKE, CONTRACTS OF CARRIAGE BY AIR 38 (2nd ed. 2010). 
 80. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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transfers.81 As such, it is difficult to identify the unborn child as a 
member of a class or of a particular description per Section 1(3) of the 
Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.82  
If the action under the aviation conventions fails, it is doubtful 
whether a claim under the Congenital Disabilities Act 1976 would be 
successful. The concept of exclusivity is central to the application of the 
aviation conventions which provides that the claimant is precluded from 
bringing a claim against the carrier under national law for an incident 
that took place during international carriage even when the carrier is not 
liable under the aviation Conventions.83 English courts have 
demonstrated remarkable consistency in the application of the exclusivity 
principle.84 Most recently, the Supreme Court of the UK in the case of 
Stott v. Thomas Cook Tour Operators Ltd.85 dismissed the claim of a 
disabled passenger against the tour operator brought under the UK 
Disability Regulations.86 The relevant incident took place on board the 
aircraft, yet the claim was brought under the Regulations because they 
permit recovery for injury to feelings, which is not recoverable under the 
MC (or the WCS).87 The Supreme Court was quick to dismiss the claim 
by applying the principle of exclusivity:  
  
 81. See e.g., General Conditions of Carriage, BRITISH AIRWAYS, 
https://www.britishairways.com/en-gb/information/legal/british-airways/general-
conditions-of-carriage (last visited Jan. 22, 2018). 
 82. The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, c. 31, (Eng.). 
 83. MC, supra note 1, art. 29; WC, supra note 1, art. 24. 
 84. See, e.g., Sidhu v. British Airways Plc. [1997] AC 430 (HL) (appeal taken 
from Scot.). 
 85. Stott v. Thomas Cook Tour Operators Ltd. [2014] UKSC 15, [2014] AC 1347 
(Lord Toulson SCJ) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 86. Civil Aviation (Access to Air Travel for Disabled Persons and Persons with 
Reduced Mobility) Regulations 2007, SI 1895/2007 (UK) (implementing Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 1107/2006 of Jul. 5, 2006, which concerns the rights of persons with 
reduced mobility and disabled persons when traveling by air) [hereinafter Civil Aviation 
Regulation]; see also Regulation 1107/2006 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 5 July 2006 Concerning the Rights of Disabled Persons and Persons with 
Reduced Mobility When Travelling by Air, 2006 O.J. (L 204) 1 (EC). 
 87. Civil Aviation Regulation art. 9; see MC, supra note 1, art. 17(1) (providing 
that “[t]he carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a 
passenger upon condition only that the accident which caused the death or injury took 
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or 
disembarking”) (emphasis added). The WC has a similar provision. WC, supra note 1, 
art. 17. 
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Should a claim for damages for ill treatment in breach of equality laws 
as a general class, or, more specifically, should a claim for damages for 
failure to provide properly for the needs of a disabled passenger, be 
regarded as outside the substantive scope of the Convention? As to the 
general question, my answer is no . . . [W]hat matters is not the quality 
of the cause of action but the time and place of the accident or mishap. 
The Convention is intended to deal comprehensively with the carrier’s 
liability for whatever may physically happen to passengers between 
embarkation and disembarkation.88 
It is clear that the matter (i.e., whether the international carriage 
regime(s) should govern an action brought by an unborn child injured 
during the course of transit) remains unsolved under both the sea and the 
air convention regimes. It is fair to say that authorities in the context of 
carriage by air seem to suggest that the international regime should 
govern such an action. This would be the preferred solution of the 
authors under the Athens regime too.  
Article 1(3) of the Athens Convention 1974/2002 defines a ship that 
comes under the Athens regime as a “seagoing vessel, excluding an air-
cushion vehicle;” therefore, is clear that air-cushion vessels, such as 
hovercraft, are excluded from the scope of the Athens regime.89 Yet, the 
Convention provides no further guidance as to the physical attributes a 
craft should carry to be considered as a “ship.”90 Similarly, it is not clear 
what the term “seagoing” means. For example, would the Convention 
apply to passengers who purchase tickets for a ride on an inflatable 
raft?91 The answer depends on whether such a craft can be considered a 
  
 88. Stott v. Thomas Cook Tour Operators Ltd. [2014] UKSC 15, [61] (Lord 
Toulson SCJ) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 89. See generally Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3; Athens Convention 
2002, supra note 14. In the UK, the rights of hovercraft passengers and their baggage are 
covered by the Carriage by Air Act. See generally Carriage by Air Act 1961, c. 27, 
amended by sched. 1 of the Hovercraft (Civil Liability) Order 1986, SI 1305/1986, The 
Hovercraft (Civil Liability) (Amendment) Order 1987, SI 1835/1987. 
 90. See generally Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3; Athens Convention 
2002, supra note 14. The position is different under some other international conventions. 
See, e.g., International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea r. 3(a), Oct. 20, 1972, 
1050 U.N.T.S. 17. A vessel is defined as “includ[ing] every description of water craft . . . 
used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water.” Id.  
 91. Soyer, Boundaries of the Athens Convention, supra note 29, at 433–34 (“It 
was held in McEwan v. Bingham (t/a Studland Watersports) that a seventeen-foot 
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“ship” under national law92 and whether it is adequate that the craft is 
capable of proceeding to sea or essential that it actually goes to sea.93 If 
the latter is correct, a vessel operated within a harbour to provide sight-
seeing tours for tourists will possibly not be regarded as sea-going. 
Therefore, there is a genuine possibility that in case of an accident, 
passengers who purchase a ticket for a ride on an inflatable raft in 
Barbados will be treated differently than those who enjoy a similar ride 
on the coast of Dominica (both of whom are parties to the Athens 
Convention 1974).  
A final point on the scope of the Athens regime relates to the 
definition of “carrier.” By virtue of Article 1 of the Convention “carrier” 
means a person by or on behalf of whom a contract of carriage has been 
concluded, whether the carriage is actually performed by that person or 
by a performing carrier.94 The definition of “carrier” is very wide, 
suggesting that anybody who has been involved in the process of 
establishing a contractual relationship with the passenger could possibly, 
  
inflatable banana raft which was towed in a bay by a marine assault craft was not a 
vessel.”).  
 92. MSA 1995, supra note 61, § 313. As far as law that applies in England and 
Wales is concerned, the most general definition of the term can be found in MSA. Id. 
This section indicates that the term “ship” includes every description of vessel used in 
navigation. Id. Over the years, British judges have equated navigation with 
controlled/planned travel over the water and set their face against classifying crafts used 
purely for pleasure purposes (i.e., messing about in boats) as vessels capable of 
navigation. Compare Steedman v. Schofield [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 163 (QB) (Eng.), and 
R v. Goodwin [2005] EWCA (Crim) 3184, [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 432 (Eng.), and Curtis 
v. Wild [1991] 4 All ER 172 (QB) (Eng.), with Michael v. Musgrave [2011] EWHC 
(Admlty) 1428 (Eng.) (holding that a rigid inflatable boat was a ship within the scope of 
the Athens Convention 1974), and South West Strategic Health Auth. v. Bay Island 
Voyages [2015] EWCA (Civ) 708 (Eng.). 
 93. See generally Salt Union Ltd. v. Wood [1893] 1 QB 370 (Eng.) (discussing 
that a steamer used to carry salt upon the rivers Weaver and Mersey from Windsor to 
Liverpool was held to be a non-sea-going vessel as the steamer never set out to go 
anywhere other than inland waters); see also Union SS Co of New Zealand Ltd v 
Commonwealth (1925) 37 CLR 130 (Austl.); Kirmani v Captain Cook Cruises 
Proprietary Ltd (1985) 159 CLR 351 (Austl.). 
 94. Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 1. The same Article stipulates that 
“performing carrier” is “a person other than the carrier, being the owner, charterer or 
operator of a ship, who actually performs the whole or a part of the carriage.” Id. 
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regardless of their status, be regarded as the contractual carrier.95 
Therefore, a tour operator could be treated as a carrier under the 
Convention although the actual sea transport is performed by another 
carrier.96 This is not necessarily an adverse development for passengers 
as it enables them to bring an action against tour operators in cases of 
mishaps occurring at the sea leg of a package holiday. However, legal 
complications might arise if national or EU law provides a different 
liability regime for package holidays. A question will arise whether the 
provisions of the Athens Convention or legislation designed to deal with 
package holidays would apply in such a case.97 Any such difficulty can 
be easily avoided at the implementation level, if the legislator is aware 
that the definition of “carrier” under the Athens regime could possibly 
create a conflict with legislation dealing with package holidays.  
  
 95. See United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea art. 1, ¶ 1, 
Mar. 31, 1978, 1695 U.N.T.S. 3 (providing a similar definition of the term “carrier”). 
 96. See Lee v. Airtours Holidays Ltd. [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 683, [32] (Cent. 
London Cty. Ct.) (Eng.). His Honour Judge Hallgarten QC made the following 
observation:                          
I do not consider that the [Athens] Convention is concerned with status at all: there is 
nothing which confines its application to concerns in the nature of shipping lines. 
Basically what emerge from the Convention are two categories: 
 (1) the carrier—being the person by or on whose behalf a contract of carriage has been 
concluded; and 
 (2) the performing carrier—being the person to whom such carriage is entrusted. 
As I see it, the essential question is whether, as between the claimants and the [tour 
operators] there was a contract of carriage by sea: if so then the [tour operators] assumed 
responsibilities as carriers, with the word carrier being used in a non-technical sense. . . . 
The matter is very largely one of impression, but for my part I see no difficulty in saying 
that the [tour operators] were carriers, in that the agreement with the claimants included 
obligations pertaining to carriage by sea and to that extent, it represented a contract for 
the carriage by sea of the claimants by the [tour operators].  
Id. See also Norfolk v. My Travel Grp. Plc. [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 106 (Plymouth Cty. 
Ct.) (Eng.). 
 97. See generally The Package Travel, Package Holidays and Package Tours 
Regulations 1992, SI 3288/1992 [hereinafter Package Regulation 1992] (intending to 
implement Council Directive 90/314/EEC of Jun. 13, 1990, on Package Travel, Package 
Holidays and Package Tours, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 59 into U.K. law). The tension between 
The Package Regulation 1992 and the Athens Convention 1974 was apparent in Norfolk 
v. My Travel Group Plc. [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 106 and Lee v. Airtours Holidays Ltd. 
[2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 683. It is believed that now that the Athens Convention has been 
made part of EU law with a Council Regulation, the Athens Convention will have 
priority in resolving any issue of conflict between these two pieces of legislation. 
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The definitions of contracting and actual (performing) carrier are 
more detailed in the aviation conventions yet not necessarily more 
restrictive for the reasons analysed below.98 Both contracting and actual 
carriers are subject to the provisions of the MC (and the Guadalajara 
Convention of the WCS).99 The contracting carrier is the person that “as 
a principal makes a contract of carriage governed by this Convention 
with a passenger . . . or with a person acting on behalf of the 
passenger”;100 the actual carrier is the person who “performs, by virtue of 
authority from the contracting carrier, the whole or part of the carriage, 
but is not with respect to such part a successive carrier within the 
meaning of this Convention.”101 The definition of contracting carriers is 
wide enough to include tour operators, yet it would exclude travel agents 
issuing tickets on behalf of air carriers or tour operators. As was recently 
demonstrated in the West Caribbean case, there is no requirement for a 
contracting carrier to operate aircraft: a US shell-company (Newvac) was 
found to be “a contracting carrier” under the MC for having leased 
aircraft and crew from the actual carrier (West Caribbean Airways) and 
in turn contracting for the seating capacity of the aircraft (and other 
holiday-related services) with a travel agent (Globe Trotter) which 
eventually sold the individual tickets to the passengers.102 Furthermore, 
the court held that Globe Trotter was acting on behalf of the passengers, 
although none were identified at the time of its contract with Newvac: 
“Newvac and Globe Trotter clearly contemplated that Globe Trotter 
would procure passengers for the flights and the fully inclusive tour 
packages that were to be supplied by Newvac, and that Globe Trotter 
would act on behalf of the passengers in this regard.”103 
Therefore, both international regimes provide for wide definitions of 
carrier that can be extended to cover tour operators. This is not 
necessarily a bad solution. Still, it is one that needs to be borne in mind, 
especially when states implement the Athens regime into their law to 
  
 98. See MC, supra note 1, arts. 39–48. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See id. art. 39 (emphasis added). 
 101. Id. (emphasis added). 
 102. In re West Caribbean Airways, 619 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2007), aff’d, 
584 F.3d 1052 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 103. Id. at 1308.     
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avoid any potential conflict with national law designed to deal with the 
legal position of tour operators.   
B) Identifying the Basis of Liability  
In the Athens regime, the liability regime that governs claims for 
personal injury or loss of life, or damage to or loss of luggage depends 
on the source of the incident that gives rise to the claim.104 The 
Conventions draw a distinction between “shipping incidents” and “non-
shipping incidents.”105 In the Athens Convention 1974, an incident is 
deemed to be shipping-related “if the death of or personal injury to the 
passenger or the loss of or damage to cabin luggage arose from or in 
connexion with the shipwreck, collision, stranding, explosion or fire, or 
defect in the ship.”106 It is evident that this definition is very general and 
could lead to disputes in many instances. For example, in its technical 
sense “collision” occurs only between two ships.107 Therefore, if the ship 
carrying passengers comes into contact with a fixed object, would that be 
treated as a shipping incident? Considering the ethos behind the relevant 
provision (i.e., providing a favourable liability regime for passengers in 
case of a casualty emerging from ship operations), one might be inclined 
to answer this question in a positive fashion. Still, it is possible that this 
issue might be the focus of litigation. More challenging questions would 
surround the concept of “defect in the ship.” As no further attempt has 
been made to clarify the meaning of this term, it is certainly arguable that 
food poisoning caused by corrosion of the stoves in the kitchen of the 
ship is attributable to a “defect in the ship.” By the same token, injury 
caused by the malfunctioning of the sliding doors in the restaurant of a 
cruise ship could be attributable to a “defect in the ship.” The authors do 
not believe that it was the intention of the draftsmen to attribute such a 
  
 104. See, e.g., Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 3. 
 105. Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 3; Athens Convention 2002, supra 
note 14, art. 3. 
 106. Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, at art. 3(3). A common cause of 
injuries on board is rough weather. The case law is clear that death/injury or damage to 
luggage arising from rough weather is not a shipping incident. See, e.g., Hollingworth v. 
Southern Ferries Ltd. [1977] 2 Lloyd’s L. Reps. 70 (QB) at 79 (Eng.); see also Davies v. 
Stena Line [2005] EWHC 420 (QB), [2005] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 13 (Eng.). 
 107. See Edwards v. Quickenden [1939] 1 ALL ER 759 (Eng.). 
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wide meaning to the term “defect in the ship.” This kind of expansive 
construction has the potential of converting hotel type incidents into 
shipping-related incidents. Unfortunately, the wording is far from perfect 
and one can see how it can create confusion.    
Appreciating the pitfalls of such lenient drafting, an attempt has been 
made in the Athens Convention 2002 to offer a comprehensive definition 
of a shipping incident. The Athens Convention 2002 describes it as 
“shipwreck, capsizing, collision or stranding of the ship, explosion or fire 
in the ship, or defect in the ship.”108 The addition of the word “capsizing” 
is intended to clarify that an incident that does not necessarily cause 
damage or destruction to the ship, but nevertheless leads to personal 
injury or death as a result of the ship overturning keel up and deck down, 
will still be viewed as a shipping incident for the purpose of determining 
the relevant liability regime.109 It is debatable whether the word 
“capsizing” would cover a situation where the ship takes a significant 
list, during which death of or injuries to passengers occur, and then 
comes back upright. Considering the justification for adding the word 
“capsize” to the definition, it is the view of the authors that this kind of
incident (e.g., listing of the vessel) should be regarded as a shipping 
incident. It is also made explicit in the definition that the explosion or 
fire must be directly connected with the ship or her cargo.110
Interestingly, though, it seems that the definition does not make an 
inquiry as to the cause of the fire and explosion. Therefore, fire on board 
of the ship that causes personal injury or death should be treated as a 
shipping incident regardless of whether it has been started as a result of 
negligence of a group of passengers111 or negligence of the cook!       
More fundamentally, a defect in the ship has been described as 
any malfunction, failure or non-compliance with applicable safety 
regulations in respect of any part of the ship or its equipment when 
108. Athens Convention 2002, supra note 14, art. 3(5)(a). 
109. The use of the word “chavirement” in the French text leaves no doubt that 
this was the intended outcome of the amendment.   
110. Athens Convention 2002, supra note 14, art. 3(5)(a).
111. However, if carrier can prove that the loss was “caused or contributed to by 
the fault or neglect of the passenger [making a claim], the court . . . may exonerate the 
carrier wholly or partly from [their] liability in accordance with the provisions of the law 
of that court.” Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 6; Athens Convention 2002, 
supra note 14, art. 6. 
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used for the escape, evacuation, embarkation and disembarkation of 
passengers; or when used for the propulsion, steering, safe navigation, 
mooring, anchoring, arriving at or leaving berth or anchorage, or 
damage control after flooding; or when used for the launching of life 
saving appliances.112  
This is a thorough definition that possibly provides answers to the 
questions raised above under the Athens Convention 1974. Still, there 
might be borderline cases where it is debatable whether the cause of the 
incident is shipping related or not. Think of a situation where the 
passenger, prior to the ship’s sailing, steps into an open engine hatch left 
by contractors who were distracted by an impending emergency. There is 
no doubt that the incident is attributable to failure or non-compliance 
with safety regulations in respect of a part of the ship. However, the 
definition provides that the incident must also arise when the relevant 
part of the ship is “used for the escape, evacuation, embarkation and 
disembarkation of passengers; . . . or for the propulsion, steering, safe 
navigation, mooring,” etc.113 Given that the vessel, in our example, was 
not in the course of navigation and the relevant part was not used in 
embarkation, disembarkation, escape, evacuation, propulsion, or steering, 
the carrier might challenge any suggestion that the loss has resulted from 
a shipping incident.114 A more difficult case is when a ship is attacked by 
pirates as a result of a security failure on the part of the crew, claiming 
the lives of passengers. It is possible to argue that the crew is part of the 
ship and their failure to comply with safety regulations to ensure safe 
navigation of the ship would mean that the loss relates to a shipping 
incident even though the pirates are external to the ship.115 These issues 
aside, it is undeniable that the definitions provided in the Athens 
Convention 2002 mark a huge improvement on the definitions that 
appear in the Athens Convention 1974.   
  
 112. Athens Convention 2002, supra note 14, at art. 3. 
 113. Id. 
 114. If successful, this would mean that the carrier would face a fault-based 
liability regime in this instance rather than a strict liability regime.     
 115. Athens Convention 2002, supra note 14. The carrier is exonerated from 
liability only if it can prove that the loss was wholly caused by an act or omission done 
with the intent to cause the incident by a third party. Id. art. 3. In case of crew’s 
negligence contributing to the piratical attack, it will be very difficult for the carrier to 
rely on this exception. 
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The aviation conventions do not make such fine distinctions. The 
liability of air carriers for the death or bodily injury of a passenger is 
governed by Article 17, which provides that “[t]he carrier is liable for 
damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger upon 
condition only that the accident which caused the death or injury took 
place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of 
embarking or disembarking.”116 In that respect, their liability depends on 
the nature of the incident causing the death or bodily injury (“accident”) 
and the location of the accident (from the moment of embarkation, while 
on board the aircraft and until disembarkation from the aircraft is 
completed).117  
Article 17 is arguably the most litigated provision of the aviation 
Conventions, and a thorough examination of the jurisprudence is outside 
the scope of this paper. Still, a few relevant thoughts are in order.118 An 
“accident” for the purposes of the conventions has been defined as “an 
unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the 
passenger . . . [and not his/her] own internal reaction to the usual, normal 
and expected operation of the aircraft.”119 Courts initially linked the 
“unusual” event to the technical operation of the aircraft, rightly holding 
that heavy landings or aircraft crashes that result in death or bodily injury 
of passengers qualify as accidents under the conventions.120  
At the same time, courts looked for unusual events in the cabin and 
held that “a fall in an aircraft toilet caused by some slippery material, 
probably soap, on the floor” or “[t]he fall on to a passenger of an object 
from an overhead locker” are accidents.121 Still, courts declined to find an 
  
 116. MC, supra note 1, art. 17; see also WC, supra note 1, art. 17. 
 117. See MC, supra note 1, art. 17; WC, supra note 1, art. 17.  
 118. It is important to note that the term “accident” did not necessarily entail 
considerations of fault and reasonable behaviour on the carriers’ part. See LELOUDAS, 
supra note 39, § 4.50. Otherwise, claimants would be required to delve into a prolonged 
evaluation of a little-known technology that was still developing. Also, such an inquiry 
would make the defence of all necessary measures redundant: the defence was designed 
to pose on the carrier the burden of proving that it was not at fault and behaved 
reasonably by taking all precautions that were available to it. In essence, it was the carrier 
that was required to produce an evaluation of what went wrong with the relevant 
technology and whether the mishap could have been avoided. Id.  
 119. Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405–06 (1985). 
 120. SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 69, ¶ 691.  
 121. Id. ¶¶ 693–94. 
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accident when a passenger fell in the cabin as a result of “shoes or 
blanket bags or rubbish on the cabin floor.”122 These items are routinely 
found in the cabin floor and there is nothing unusual regarding their 
position. Similarly, falling “on a plastic strip associated with the seat 
tracking” is not an accident as the strip is permanently placed on the floor 
of the aircraft.123  
The prevailing definition of accident provides that the passenger’s 
internal reaction to a normal flight cannot qualify as an accident.124 This 
element has been used by courts to prevent recovery for death or bodily 
injuries caused by the passenger’s medical condition during an 
uneventful flight, such as heart attacks, hearing loss caused by the 
normal depressurisation of the cabin during landing, or deep vein 
thrombosis caused by the cramped conditions of economy class.125 In 
such situations, yet again, there was nothing untoward with the technical 
operation of the aircraft that might have caused the injuries in question.  
Over the years, courts have interpreted the term “accident” in a 
flexible manner in two respects.126 First, they looked to the cabin crew as 
a potential source of unexpected behaviour. In that respect, “the supply 
of infected food, causing food poisoning . . . [and] the spilling of hot 
coffee into a passenger’s lap (whether as a result of turbulence, mere 
inattention on the part of a member of the cabin staff or the acts of 
another passenger)” constitute accidents for the purposes of Article 17.127 
Most importantly, the refusal of cabin crew to assist a passenger with a 
health issue during flight, or the failure to divert a flight to a nearby 
airport following a medical emergency on board, have also been found to 
be unusual events triggering the liability of the air carrier.128 Second, 
courts have rejected (admittedly reluctantly) the argument that Article 17 
requires the injury-causing event to be a “risk characteristic” to air travel, 
what in the Athens regime would be described as a “shipping incident.” 
which inevitably opened the door for torts committed by fellow 
  
 122. Id. ¶ 694. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Air France, 470 U.S. at 406. 
 125. SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 69, ¶¶ 697–701. 
 126. Air France, 470 U.S. at 405 (“This definition should be flexibly applied after 
assessment of all the circumstances surrounding a passenger’s injuries.”). 
 127. SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 69, ¶ 693. 
 128. Id. ¶ 697. 
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passengers to be considered accidents.129 Still, it is difficult to discern a 
principled approach by courts which, in general, will try to link the 
accident to the operation of the aircraft or the behavior of the crew. For 
example, sexual assaults by one passenger on another during flight 
triggered the application of Article 17 on the basis that “the close 
proximity of economy class passengers and the fact that they were in 
darkness” were characteristics of air travel.130   
At the same time, courts tend to treat hijackings and other terrorism-
related events as accidents although the air carrier is usually unable to 
foresee or prevent them131—in essence ignoring the “all necessary 
measures” defence (in the WCS) and the fault-defences of the MC for 
claims above 113,000 SDRs.132 This is the result of the Saks decision 
“reject[ing] the limitation that the event must be . . . unintentional” to 
qualify as an accident.133 
What the colorful history of the interpretation of the term “accident” 
demonstrates is the misjudgment of setting up a liability system on a 
term that is susceptible to change alongside technological evolution and 
social perceptions.134 In the 1920s the term “accident” was representing 
the unknown that exceeds technological capabilities whereas today there 
is no such thing as an “unpredictable” accident anymore.135 Still, the 
attempts to replace the term “accident” with the less contentious “event” 
have always failed on the basis that such change will increase insurance 
costs, especially if recovery for personal injuries (as distinguished from 
bodily injuries) is also permitted.136   
In that respect, the authors believe that the drafting of the Athens 
Convention 2002 should be praised in two respects. First, the term 
“incident” is less contentious than the term “accident,” as it does not 
need to be sudden or unforeseeable and it makes no difference whether it 
is a natural occurrence or the conduct of the carrier or a third party.137 
  
 129. Id. ¶ 695. 
 130. Id.   
 131. MONTREAL CONVENTION, supra note 68, at 17–18.      
 132. See WC, supra note 1, art. 20; see also MC, supra note 1, art. 21.  
 133. DEMPSEY & MILDE, supra note 37, at 138.  
 134. See LELOUDAS, supra note 39, § 4.164–.165 
 135. See id. § 4.168.  
 136. See GCP, supra note 35, art. III (providing that the air carrier is liable for 
damage sustained in case of death or personal injury). 
 137. MONTREAL CONVENTION, supra note 68, at 18–11.      
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Second, a clear statement that shipping and non-shipping incidents are 
included in the cover of the Convention, albeit under different liability 
regimes, is welcomed. Admittedly, this approach raises issues of 
delimitation with the claimants attempting to broaden the scope of what 
shipping-related incidents are to take advantage of the preferential 
liability regime. Yet, overall, this structure avoids disputes over the 
question whether the incident shall be causally connected to the 
operation of the mode of transport. 
C)  Damages Recoverable  
Under the Athens regime, the carrier is obliged to compensate a 
passenger for loss suffered as a result of the death of the passenger or 
personal injury suffered by him.138 However, the relevant provision 
makes no attempt to define the meaning of personal injury other than 
stating that “ʽloss’ shall not include punitive or exemplary damages.”139 
It has been apparently left to the national laws to determine what 
qualifies as personal injury. For example, would it be possible for a 
passenger to claim loss caused by mental (psychiatric) injury suffered as 
a result of a shipping-related casualty? Under common law, if a 
passenger is injured or loses his life during carriage, action for damages 
caused by pain and suffering, including suffering for distress, would be 
recoverable on the premise that such an action would be effective in tort 
as much as in contract.140 However, with the introduction of the Athens 
regime into English law, and in particular considering that all claims 
against the carrier must be brought under the Convention by virtue of 
Article 14, the key issue is to establish what kind of damages would be 
recoverable as “personal injury” under the Convention. Courts in some 
Contracting States have already shown willingness to allow claims of 
this nature.141 However, there is certainly no uniform view on the matter.  
  
 138. See Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 3. 
 139. Athens Convention 2002, supra note 14, art. 3(5)(d).  
 140. See, e.g., Thompson v. Royal Mail Lines [1957] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 99 (QB) 
(Eng.). 
 141. See generally Kotai v. Queen of the North, [2009] B.C.S.C. 1180 (Can.) 
(presuming that compensation for physiological injuries was recoverable under the 
Marine Liability Act, which incorporates the Athens Convention 1974). 
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The drafters of the aviation conventions have rejected references to 
personal injury.142 Instead they opted for holding “[t]he carrier liable for 
damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger.”143 The 
reason behind such legislative choice was the concern that the litigation 
floodgates would open with the inevitable increase of the premium level 
as “[t]he expression ‘personal injury’ would open the door to non-
physical personal injuries such as slander, libel, discrimination, fear, 
fright and apprehension.”144 
In that respect, case law in the context of the aviation conventions 
both in the UK145 and the United States of America (U.S.)146 cannot be 
used as guidance in the interpretation of the Athens regime. Still, a few 
thoughts are required to demonstrate the difficulties that courts have 
encountered in distinguishing between bodily injury and personal injury. 
The courts’ main concern was to decide whether the term “bodily injury” 
would cover any kind of mental injury, an exercise that became more 
difficult following the disagreement over the scope of the original French 
term lèsion corporelle in the original WC.147 Following a number of 
(sometimes conflicting) decisions on both sides of the Atlantic, the 
consensus is that “there can be no recovery for ‘psychic’ injury which is 
  
 142. Except for the GCP, which never came into force. It provided that “[t]he 
carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or personal injury of a passenger 
upon condition only that the accident which caused the death or injury took place on 
board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or 
disembarking.” GCP, supra note 35, art. IV. It also provided the qualification that “the 
carrier will not be liable if the death or injury resulted solely from the state of health of 
the passenger.” Id. 
 143. MC, supra note 1, art. 17; see also WC, supra note 1, art. 17 (“The carrier is 
liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any 
other bodily injury suffered by a passenger.”). 
 144. SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 69, ¶ 704. 
 145. King v. Bristow Helicopters Ltd. [2002] UKHL 7, [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 745 
(appeal taken from Scot.). 
 146. Eastern Airlines Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991) (holding that the Warsaw 
Convention did not permit recovery for mental injury unaccompanied by physical injury). 
It should be borne in mind that at the Montreal Convention diplomatic conference in 
1999, Sweden’s proposal that there should be a separate head of claim for mental injury 
was withdrawn as a result of strong resistance coming from the airline and insurance 
lobby. 
 147. See SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 69, ¶ 704. The German and French 
delegates at the Conference leading to the drafting of the Montreal Convention 1999 
argued that the term covers mental injuries. See id.   
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unaccompanied by physical injury”148—with “accompanied by” meaning 
that there is a causal link between the physical injury and the mental 
injury and not the other way around.149 Most importantly, it is obvious 
from the discussions over the scope of the term “bodily injury” that any 
change to “personal injury” (as in the case of the GCP) would permit 
recovery for standalone mental injuries.150 Not surprisingly, aviation 
insurance policies also make distinctions along the same lines. Major air 
carriers often define “bodily” injury in an extensive manner to cover 
standalone mental anguish, fright and shock, while policies addressed to 
general aviation users (such as AVN1D) define “bodily injury” as 
including “bodily injury, sickness or disease including death at any time
resulting therefrom.”151
A related but more difficult question is whether a passenger could 
claim damages for distress or vexation following breach of the contract 
of carriage from a non-shipping related incident. Imagine the position of 
a passenger who misses most of the sightseeing and trips after suffering 
from food poisoning as a result of a meal served at the restaurant of a 
cruise liner. As far as the English law is concerned, it has been confirmed 
by the highest judicial authority that this kind of damages for breach of 
contract can be awarded in a group of cases in which at least one of the 
“major or important” objects of the contract was to provide “pleasure, 
relaxation, or peace of mind.”152 It is hardly an overstatement to suggest 
that one of the major and important objects of a contract for a cruise in 
the Caribbean is pleasure and relaxation.153 It is, therefore, plausible 
under English law that a passenger who is on a cruise and suffers distress 
148. Id. ¶ 706.
149. Id. ¶ 708. At the time of writing, leave to appeal before the US Supreme 
Court has been requested in the case of Doe v. Etihad Airways, P.J.S.C., 870 F.3d 406 
(6th Cir. 2017) which examines closely this causal requirement in the MC.
150. SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 69, ¶ 704.
151. See, e.g., AVN 1D AMD, AIRCRAFT INSURANCE POLICY 4 (2016).
152. Farley v. Skinner, [2001] UKHL 49, [2002] 2 AC 737 (HL) 732 at 749–750 
(Eng.). This principle was also followed in Canada and New Zealand. See Vorvis v. Ins. 
Corp. of B.C. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085 (Can.); Byrne v. Auckland Irish Soc’y Inc. [1979] 1 
NZLR 351 (N.Z.). 
153. See, e.g., Jarvis v. Swans Tours Ltd., [1973] QB 233 (Eng.) (granting an 
award for damage caused by distress was made against a package-tour operator who 
provided accommodation failing short of the standard promised and so spoilt their
client’s holiday).
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as a result of a non-shipping related incident could bring an action for 
breach of contract.154 However, a similar outcome is highly unlikely with 
regard to other contracts of carriage concerning passengers.155 Also, a 
completely different outcome is possible in other Contracting States.156
Claims for distress are destined to fail under the aviation conventions 
on the basis that the passenger in question has suffered no bodily 
injury.157 Claims for breach of the carriage contract (other than non-
performance of the contract, which falls outside the scope of the 
conventions) or misrepresentation will also fail, since the conventions are 
the exclusive avenue for a passenger to claim against an air carrier by 
satisfying the requirements of Article 17 of the aviation conventions. 158
Any other interpretation would undermine the scope of the conventions 
as it would effectively allow the recovery of non-bodily damages. Such 
claims often originate from business class passengers who complain 
about the quality of the service offered by the air carrier: for example, a 
passenger brought a claim for misrepresentation (under English law) 
against South African Airways (SAA) on the basis that, contrary to the 
carrier’s advertisements, his business class seat was not reclining fully.159
His claim failed because he could not satisfy the requirements of Article 
17.160 Similarly, a business class passenger recently claimed loss of 
amenity because Qantas did not offer the usual standard of service as a 
result of a strike in South Africa with his claim dismissed on the basis 
that he suffered no bodily injury.161 The authors believe that the example 
of the air law conventions should be followed by the Athens regime; 
allowing such actions to run in parallel to the Athens Conventions would 
154. See id.
155. See Farley v. Skinner, at ¶ 1.
156. In French law, for example, rather than proving that the type of loss is one 
that recovery is possible for, the claimant must prove that a causal link between the 
breach and the claimant’s loss exists. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.][CIVIL CODE] art. 1231 (Fr.).
157. See MC, supra note 1, art. 17(1); WC, supra note 1, art. 17.  
158. See supra Section III.A.
159. Edward Spencer, UK: Gubay v SAA: Stretching The Boundaries of 
Convention Exclusivity, MONDAQ (Feb. 9, 2009), 
http://www.mondaq.com/uk/x/74056/Marine+Shipping/Gubay+v+SAA+Stretching+The
+Boundaries+Of+Convention+Exclusivity.
160. MC, supra note 1, art. 17. 
161. Teamoke v. Qantas Airways Ltd., 20 IATA Liability Rep. (Condon/Forsyth) 
at 8–9 (2017).
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seriously undermine their effectiveness. Courts have also accepted that 
the same is true with respect to delay claims under Article 19 of the 
aviation conventions, which reads as follows: “The carrier is liable for 
damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, 
baggage or cargo”; Article 19 does not permit the recovery of a 
passenger’s psychological, emotional injury or inconvenience and loss of 
vacation caused by delay.162 
Another grey area is the type of damages that can be claimed by 
passengers for the loss of or damage to cabin luggage. Article 1(7) of the 
Athens Convention 2002 provides that “‘loss of or damage to luggage’ 
includes pecuniary loss resulting from the luggage not having been re-
delivered to the passenger within a reasonable time after the arrival of the 
ship on which the luggage has been or should have been carried, but does 
not include delays resulting from labour disputes.”163 In common law, 
pecuniary loss arising out of breach of contract takes two main forms.164 
First, there is what is called normal pecuniary loss—that is, loss that any 
claimant would likely suffer because of the breach.165 Essentially, this is 
the difference between the value of the performance as contracted for 
and its value as in fact tendered.166 In cases where the luggage is lost, this 
will be the value of the luggage; in cases of damage to the luggage, this 
will be the diminution in its value. Second, there is consequential loss, 
which is the expenditure or loss of profit over and above the loss of or 
diminution in the value of the immediate subject matter of the contract.167 
Given that the definition of the word “pecuniary loss” is left to national 
courts, it is debatable to what extent consequential loss of the latter type 
is recoverable. However, even if it is assumed that this kind of damage is 
recoverable, there is the burning question of whether this holds true for 
cabin luggage. The scenario which comes to mind is a passenger whose 
laptop computer is lost as a result of a shipping related incident. If the 
  
 162. MC, supra note 1, art. 19; SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 69, ¶¶ 1008, 
1011. 
 163. Athens Convention 2002, supra note 14, art. 1(7). 
 164. See Farley v. Skinner [2001] UKHL 49, [2002] 2 AC 737 (HL) at 749–750 
(Eng.). 
 165. British Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Underground Elec. Rys. [1912] 3 
AC 128 (HL) (appeal taken from KB). 
 166. See Farley v. Skinner, at ¶ 20. 
 167. See Spring v. Guardian Assurance P.L.C., [1995] 2 A.C. 296 (HL) (appeal 
taken from UK). 
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passenger proves that the laptop contained information that would have 
helped him to secure a lucrative contract, would he be able to claim 
compensation for consequential loss over the value of the laptop to the 
limitation amount specified in Article 8 of the Convention? The authors 
believe that this is unlikely. Cabin luggage has been described under 
Article 1(6) of the Convention as “luggage which the passenger has in 
his cabin or is otherwise in his possession, custody or control.”168 As the 
terms “luggage” and “cabin luggage” have been described separately 
under the Convention169 and Article 1(7) only refers to the former, it is 
logical to suggest that the intention of the draftsmen was to exclude cabin 
luggage from this provision.170
The aviation conventions use the generic term “damage” without 
clarifying the meaning of the term, leaving its interpretation to national 
courts.171 Case law suggests that consequential losses of the latter type 
are recoverable, subject to the prohibition of recovering punitive, 
exemplary or any other non-compensatory damages.172 Yet, such an 
approach is not compatible with the Athens regime as the wording of the 
aviation conventions is wider, leaving more leeway to national laws.  
On the assumption that Article 1(7) of the Convention is not relevant 
in the context of cabin luggage, another interesting question is whether 
the passenger could claim damages for distress when the cabin luggage is 
not delivered by the carrier to a cruise ship passenger. Could a passenger, 
for example, claim that being deprived of his cabin luggage meant that 
he could not manage to attend formal dinners and various events on 
board the cruise liner, causing him anxiety and distress? There is no 
provision dealing with an eventuality of this kind in the Athens 
Conventions, but neither is there any provision preventing an action of 
this nature. In practice, cruise operators offer passengers who find 
themselves in this kind of predicament vouchers that can be used to 
168. See Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3.
169. It should also be noted that the limitation amount for cabin luggage has been 
specified as distinct from the limitation amount for other luggage. Athens Convention 
1974, supra note 3, art. 1(5)–(7). 
170. It should be noted that the liability regime for cabin luggage is also different 
than the liability regime for other luggage. See Athens Convention 2002, supra note 14,
art. 3(3)–(4). 
171. See, e.g., MC, supra note 1, arts. 17–22. 
172. Id. art. 29; see SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 69, ¶ 814; CLARKE,
supra note 79, at 109–10.
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purchase their next cruise ticket at a discounted rate.173 However, the 
authors believe that courts in some Contracting States could entertain an 
action of this nature from passengers.  
The consensus among courts is that damages for distress in case 
baggage is lost or delayed are not recoverable under the aviation 
conventions.174 Yet courts occasionally divert from this line and award 
damages for distress on the basis that they “compensate them for the 
stress, inconvenience, frustration and disruption to their holiday 
occasioned . . . by the delay in the arrival of their baggage.”175 Still, this 
is surely not a universal approach. 
D) Contribution Claims
Naturally, the Athens Convention is designed to be the sole 
framework by which a passenger can claim against the carrier or the 
contractual carrier. Hence, Article 14 of the Convention stipulates: “No 
action for damages for the death of or personal injury to a passenger, or 
for the loss of or damage to luggage, shall be brought against a carrier or 
performing carrier otherwise than in accordance with this 
Convention.”176 There is nothing extraordinary in this and it can be 
viewed as the price passengers need to pay in return for the protection 
that they are provided with by the Convention regime. However, could 
this Article ensure that the provisions of the Athens Convention apply 
when a claim is brought by a third party against the carrier? This was the 
central issue in South West Strategic Health Authority v. Bay Island 
Voyagers177 There, the claimant was injured on a boat trip that was 
arranged by her employers as part of a team building exercise.178 The 
claimant brought an action against her employers on the basis that they 
173. See, e.g., Darren Slade, Compensation After ‘Cruise from Hell’ with Thomson 
is Holiday Voucher, DAILY ECHO (Oct. 20, 2010), 
http://www.bournemouthecho.co.uk/news/8461685._Cruise_from_hell_compensation_is
_ 
money_off_another_holiday_/. 
174. SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 69, ¶ 1011.
175. Id.
176. Athens Convention 2002, supra note 14, art. 14. 
177. South West Strategic Health Authority v. Bay Island Voyagers [2015] EWCA 
(Civ) 708 (Eng.). 
178. Id. 
2018] Carriage Of Passengers By Sea: A Critical Analysis 517
failed to undertake a proper risk assessment and/or implement a safe 
system of work for her on the occasion of this boat outing.179 After the 
expiry of the time bar provision in the Athens Convention,180 the 
employers of the claimant brought a claim for contribution against the 
owners of the boat that the employee was on at the time of the incident 
(the carrier).181 The carrier issued an application to strike out the third-
party claim on the basis that Article 16 of the Athens Convention 
extinguished the cause of action, and, therefore, the limitation period had 
expired prior to the commencement of the third-party proceedings.182
Although it was held in lower courts that Article 16 had the effect of 
extinguishing the cause of action and struck out the third-party claim for 
contribution, the Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that: a claim for 
contribution under Section 1(1) of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 
1978 was not a claim for damages for personal injury to a passenger 
brought against a carrier and therefore not within the scope of the 
Convention, and accordingly not subject to the time bar imposed by 
Article 16(1) of the Convention; and  the carrier’s liability under the 
1978 Act to contribute was nevertheless dependent on its liability to the 
claimant as the passenger, which was governed by Athens Convention.183
On true construction, Article 16 of the Convention, although barring an 
action for damages brought after a period of two years, did not 
extinguish the right on which the action was based; accordingly, since 
the claim for contribution was based on that right (and not on that action) 
it had not been extinguished by Article 16(1).184
The Court of Appeal was of the view that a claim for contribution 
brought by a third party to the carrier has a life of its own deriving from 
the relevant English domestic statute entitlement to contribution. This 
kind of reasoning severs the link between the Athens Convention and a 
claim for contribution. Effectively, it is suggested that a contribution 
claim has nothing to do with the Athens Convention and is not, therefore, 
179. Id. 
180. Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 16(1) (“Any action for damages 
arising out of the death of or personal injury to a passenger or for the loss of or damage to 
luggage shall be time-barred after a period of two years.”).
181. South West Strategic Health Authority, at ¶ 6.
182. Id. 
183. Id.
184. Id.
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subject to the time bar provisions of the Convention, although the 
liability of the carrier to contribute is critically on its own liability to the 
passenger, which in turn is governed by the provisions of the 
Convention! Taking this to its natural conclusion, the Athens Convention 
would be critical in determining the liability of the carrier and the limits 
of such liability, but its time bar provisions should simply be ignored and 
give way to the time bar provisions stipulated in national legislation.  
The judgment clearly demonstrates that in some jurisdictions 
contribution claims by third parties against the carrier could potentially 
be treated as distinct from the Athens regime. The authors believe that 
this opens the door to bypass the Athens regime and make carriers 
subject to a different legal regime, an outcome which is clearly not in the 
spirit of Article 14 of the Athens regime. Still, this could have been 
avoided if the time bar provision in the Convention had been construed 
to have the effect of extinguishing the right for an action rather than 
simply barring the remedy of court proceedings. However, this was also 
rejected by the Court of Appeal. Although in continental jurisdictions 
time-bar provisions usually have the effect of extinguishing the right for 
an action, the Court of Appeal was adamant that the wording used in 
Article 16(1) of the Athens Convention would not have the same effect 
under English law.185
The effect of the decision of the Court of Appeal is that a carrier who 
might otherwise have availed themselves of a limitation defence under 
the Athens Convention in circumstances where the two-year limitation 
period has expired now could potentially face another route of claim 
brought against them by third parties as a claim for contribution. For a 
claim of this nature, clearly the time bar of the Athens Convention will 
not be applicable. The authors are firmly of the view that this outcome 
has the potential of undermining the Athens regime by allowing third 
185. There are decisions of English courts which have construed time bar 
provisions drafted in similar fashion to Athens Convention 1974 as baring the remedy 
only. Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 16(1). For example, the International 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law with Respect to Collision 
Between Vessels was held to be barring the remedy only by Lord Wilberforce in Aries 
Tanker Corp. v. Total Transp. Ltd. [1977] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 334 (HL) (appeal taken from 
CA) (Eng.). The relevant part of art. 7 stipulates: “[a]ctions for the recovery of damages 
are barred after an interval of two years from the date of the casualty.” International 
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law with Respect to Collision 
Between Vessels art. 7, Sept. 23, 1910, 4 U.N.T.S. 41, 51. 
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parties to bring contribution claims from the backdoor that would have 
been barred under the Conventions. However, problems of this nature 
might arise in other Contracting States and the authors believe that this is 
something that should be avoided at any cost.    
Conversely, Article 29 of the WC and Article 35 of the MC leave no 
doubt that the time bar provision extinguishes any right: “the right to 
damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within a period 
of two years, reckoned from the date of arrival at the destination, or from 
the date on which the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the date on 
which the carriage stopped.”186
Courts have held that the right for an action is “completely destroyed 
and not merely rendered unenforceable by action. It follows that it cannot 
be relied upon by way of defence to an action brought by the carrier.”187
In that respect, the debate in South West Strategic Health Authority 
would have been resolved in favour of the air carrier if such case had 
arisen in the context of the air liability conventions. However, matters 
get complicated when an indemnification action is filed from a liable 
carrier against third parties or is filed against the air carrier by a liable 
third party as there is little judicial consensus on how to treat such 
indemnification actions.188
With the objective of achieving such consensus, Article 37 of the MC 
indicates that “[n]othing in this Convention shall prejudice the question 
whether a person liable for damage in accordance with its provisions has 
a right of recourse against any other person.”189 The wording of Article 
37 of the MC makes clear that actions of indemnification initiated by 
carriers against third parties which are not subject to the Convention do 
not come into the scope of the MC, which includes the two-year 
limitation period, leaving their determination to national laws.190
Still, the wording leaves open the question whether the MC applies to 
indemnification actions filed by liable third parties which are subject to 
186. MC, supra note 1, art. 35 (emphasis added); WC, supra note 1, art. 29 
(emphasis added).
187. SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 69, ¶ 443.
188. See infra Section III. 
189. MC, supra note 1, art. 37.
190. Under English law the limitation period would be governed by the Limitation 
Act 1980, which provides that the limitation is “two years from the date on which that 
right accrued.” Limitation Act 1980, c. 58, § 10 (Eng.).
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the MC, such as a ground-handler or a contracting carrier, against an 
actual carrier for damage falling into the MC (e.g., the death of a 
passenger on board an aircraft). With exceptions, a consensus seems to 
be developing under the MC with Courts in the U.S. holding that such 
actions are not subject to the Convention on the basis that they are not 
any more actions for damages.191 Still, these decisions have been 
criticised on the basis that they create an artificial distinction between 
action for damages and indemnification.192 Under English law, Section 
5(2) of the Carriage by Air Act 1961 provides that the limitation 
provisions of the aviation conventions do not apply “to any proceedings 
for contribution between persons liable for any damage to which the 
applicable convention relates.”193 As such, Section 1(3) of the Civil 
Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 applies and provides that the carrier 
remains liable to contribute until its own liability under the aviation 
conventions is extinguished (i.e., replicates the two-year limitation 
period of the aviation conventions).194
The WCS does not contain any provisions on the right of 
indemnification, with the decision of the Supreme Court of Ontario in 
Connaught Laboratories Ltd. v. Air Canada being influential with 
respect to claims between air carriers:195
[s]uch claims are not included, not [sic] does it appear that they are 
intended to be included, within the purview of The Warsaw Convention 
which . . . deals with the claims of passengers, consignors and 
191. See, e.g., Chubb Ins. Co. of Eur. SA v. Menlo Worldwide Forwarding Inc.,
634 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2011); United Airlines Inc. v. Sercel [2012] NSWCA 24 (Austl.). 
192. Laurent Chassot, Le Domaine de La Responsabilité Du Transporteur Aérien 
International à La Lumière de Deux Dédisions Récentes, 277 REVUE FRANÇAISE DE
DROIT AÉRIEN ET SPATIAL 5, 5 (2016). 
193. SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 69, ¶ 443; Carriage by Air Act 1961, 9 
& 10 Eliz. 2 c. 27, § 5(2) (Eng.).
194. Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, c. 47, § 1(3) (Eng.) (stating “[a] 
person shall be liable to make contribution by virtue of subsection (1) above 
notwithstanding that he has ceased to be liable in respect of the damage in question since 
the time when the damage occurred, unless he ceased to be liable by virtue of the expiry 
of a period of limitation or prescription which extinguished the right on which the claim 
against him in respect of the damage was based.”).
195. Connaught Labs. Ltd. v. Air Canada (1978), 94 D.L.R. 3d 586 (Can.).
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consignees, and the liability of carriers therefor, it does not deal with 
the claims of carriers inter se.196
Still, there is no judicial consensus with respect to indemnity claims, 
with conflicting decisions resulting from within the same jurisdiction: 
In a number of Warsaw Convention cases in the United States it was 
held that art 29 of that Convention applied to recourse actions against 
carriers and a French court, in a case in which the principal claim was 
against a handling-agent who sought contribution from a carrier, held 
that art 29 did apply, as it drew no distinction between principal and 
recourse actions . . . Some decisions of US District Courts have held art 
29 applicable to claims for contribution against carriers and their 
handling agents; but it has been held in other District Court cases that 
the Convention rule does not apply to a claim by a carrier against its 
own handling-agent though it would to recourse actions against 
carriers. A decision of the French Cour de Cassation has held that the 
Convention limitation provision does not protect handling-agents in 
actions for contribution brought by carriers, even if the contract 
between the carrier and the handling-agent incorporated the Warsaw 
Convention in general terms.197
Most recently, the French Cour de Cassation, in a heavily criticised 
decision, confirmed that an indemnification action filed by the aircraft 
manufacturer against the air carrier (resulting from passengers’ death 
claims covered by the original WC) is not subject to the two-year 
limitation period. 198
In the authors’ view, indemnification claims should also come under 
the air liability regimes, as any contrary solution would have the effect of 
undermining the international liability regime. It is interesting to see that 
disputes regarding the scope of an international liability regime still 
arise, although it is expressly stipulated in the relevant Conventions that 
the right to damages shall be extinguished.199 The aviation experience on 
the issue of indemnification claims highlights that the failure of the 
196. Id. ¶ 26.
197. SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 69, ¶ 446.1 (internal citations omitted).
198. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., 
Mar. 4, 2015, Bull. civ. I, No. 327 (Fr.). 
199. See SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 69, ¶ 446.1
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Athens regime to expressly stipulate the effect of its time bar provisions 
has invited controversy and possibly hindered the prospect of achieving 
uniformity. States considering the ratification of the Convention should 
consider seriously addressing this point in their implementing legislation. 
D) Jurisdictional Issues
Article 17 of the Athens Convention 2002 is designed to provide a 
number of alternative forums for the passengers to bring their claim 
against the carriers (contractual or performing).200 Accordingly, Article 
17(1) stipulates:   
An action arising under Articles 3 and 4 of this Convention shall, at the 
option of the claimant, be brought before one of the courts listed below, 
provided that the court is located in a State Party to this Convention, 
and subject to the domestic law of each State Party governing proper 
venue within those States with multiple possible forums:  
(a) the court of the State of permanent residence or principal place of 
business of the defendant, or  
(b) the court of the State of departure or that of the destination 
according to the contract of carriage, or  
(c) the court of the State of the domicile or permanent residence of the 
claimant, if the defendant has a place of business and is subject to 
jurisdiction in that State, or 
(d) the court of the State where the contract of carriage was made, if the 
defendant has a place of business and is subject to jurisdiction in that 
State.201
The authors are firmly of the view that a number of difficulties are 
likely to arise in determining which court (if any) would have 
jurisdiction to hear a claim brought by a passenger against the carrier. 
Let us assume that the carrier is a company that has its principal place of 
business in a tax haven which is not a party to either version of the 
200. See Athens Convention 2002, supra note 14. 
201. Athens Convention 2002, supra note 14, art. 17(1). 
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Athens Convention. Also, assume that the place of departure and 
destination according to the contract of carriage is not in a country to 
which the Athens regime applies. The passenger, on the other hand, is 
domiciled in a state which has implemented the Athens regime into its 
legal system and has purchased the ticket from an independent agent 
working on behalf of the carrier in the same jurisdiction. Would that be 
adequate to enable the passenger to bring an action against the carrier in 
the jurisdiction in which he is domiciled? The answer to that question 
depends on whether, for the purposes of Article 17(c) or (d), the 
defendant carrier could be deemed to have a place of business in that 
jurisdiction simply because it performs its business through the office of 
an independent agent registered in that jurisdiction. Or alternatively, is it 
necessary that the defendant carrier has an office registered in its name in 
that jurisdiction? In various jurisdictions, the actions of travel agents, 
although they are paid commission by the carrier for booking 
reservations and disseminating brochures and advertising magazines, are 
not deemed sufficient to confer jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.202  
The WCS permits claims to be filed before the courts of the State 
Party in which the carrier is ordinarily resident,203 has its principal place 
of business, has an establishment by which the contract has been made, 
or is the final destination of the carriage in question.204
In MC, these four grounds of jurisdiction are retained (with minor 
changes of the wording) and a fifth jurisdiction has been added.205 Article 
33(2) of the MC provides that an action for damages arising from the 
death or injury of a passenger (no cargo claims) must be brought, at the 
option of the claimant,  
in the territory of the State Party in which at the time of the accident the 
passenger had his or her principal and permanent residence and to or 
from which the carrier operates services for the carriage of passengers 
by air, either on its own aircraft or on another carrier’s aircraft pursuant 
to a commercial agreement, and in which that carrier conducts its 
202. Kauffman v. Ocean Spirit Shipping Ltd., No. 4:90-cv-49, 1990 WL 483909, at 
*179 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 15, 1990); Duffy v. Grand Circle Travel, Inc., 756 N.Y.S.2d 176
(N.Y. App. Div. 2003). It must be borne in mind that these were not cases considered 
under the Athens regime.     
203. See SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 69, ¶¶ 324–25.
204. WC, supra note 1, art. 28(1). 
205. MC, supra note 1, art. 33(1). 
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business of carriage of passengers by air from premises leased or 
owned by the carrier itself or by another carrier with which it has a 
commercial agreement.206
Interestingly enough, the WCS does not permit claims to be filed 
before the court of the victims’ residence, an omission that protects the 
carrier from facing claims arising from one accident in as many 
jurisdictions as the residences of passengers carried in the aircraft. Even 
during the drafting of the MC there was no consensus in adopting it as a 
forum, yet the insistence of the U.S., which strongly advocated that its 
inclusion will protect passengers, has paid off.207 The compromise was to 
include the “fifth jurisdiction” on the condition that the defendant carrier 
has a strong commercial presence (operates services alone or a 
commercial agreement such as code-sharing and owns or leases a place 
of business) in the place of residency of the victim.208 Courts have not 
examined the “commercial presence” requirements, yet the MC wording 
would have clarified Article 17(c) of the Athens Convention: we believe 
that performing the services via an independent contractor or a travel 
agent will not satisfy the requirement as the Article clearly requires the 
premises to be leased or owned by the defendant carrier (independent 
contractors would fail this test) or at least by another carrier with whom 
the defendant has a commercial agreement (travel agents would not 
qualify as carriers).   
Having said that, the aviation conventions could also contribute to the 
debate under Article 17(1) (d) of the Athens Convention. Both of them 
provide that the passenger can bring an action where the carrier has a 
place of business through which the contract has been made, provided it 
is located in a State Party.209 Inevitably this provision has raised 
questions on the jurisdictional implications of air carriers cooperating 
with agents in various countries with the prevailing view in aviation 
206. For the purposes of art. 33(2) the Convention defines the term “commercial 
agreement” as “an agreement, other than an agency agreement, made between carriers 
and relating to the provision of their joint services for carriage of passengers by air.” Id. 
art. 33(3). It also defines “principal and permanent residence” as “the one fixed and 
permanent abode of the passenger at the time of the accident” while explicitly 
disregarding the nationality of the passenger. Id. art. 33(3). 
207. See SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 69, ¶ 441.1.
208. MC, supra note 1, art. 33(2).
209. Id. art. 33(1); WC, supra note 1, art. 28(1).
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cases (in common law jurisdictions) is that a “carrier’s establishment” 
should not necessarily “be directly owned by the carrier, as is required in 
French decisions.”210 Still, conducting business via an “ordinary agent,” 
such as an interline sales agent or an agent who sells tickets on a 
commission basis, would not be sufficient to qualify its establishment as 
the carrier’s establishment.211 A closer business relation with the agent is 
required in order to confer jurisdiction over a foreign air carrier.212
Matters could get more complicated in the scenario above if the ticket 
is purchased by the passenger through the Internet. In this situation how 
will the place of business of the defendant be determined in that case for 
these purposes? At the moment, it seems that the preferred view in the 
US is that  
[i]n the case of an Internet purchase . . . the place [is] where the 
purchasing passenger has received, through the Internet, confirmation 
of the purchase of the transportation . . . In most cases this will be the 
residence of the purchasing person, even though the air carrier’s 
Internet sales computer website may be located in another country.213
Last but not least, there is the issue of at what stage the defendant 
carrier must be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts for the purposes of 
this Article 17(1) of the Athens Convention 2002. Imagine a situation 
where the carrier has a place of business in the jurisdiction specified in 
Article 17(a), (c), or (d) at the time when the injury, loss, or damage 
occurs, but it ceases to operate in that jurisdiction by the time the claim 
under the Convention is put forward. This is a difficult question to 
answer but it is possible that by ceasing to operate in that jurisdiction the 
carrier also ceases its capability to be involved in litigation as a claimant 
or defendant. At the same time, the application of the convention is 
determined by reference to the time of injury, death, or loss rather than 
the time of filing the claim.214 As such, it is plausible (and arguably a 
210. SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 69, ¶ 438.
211. Id.
212. See generally id. 
213. GEORGE N. TOMPKINS, JR., LIABILITY RULES APPLICABLE TO INTERNATIONAL
AIR TRANSPORTATION AS DEVELOPED BY THE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 257 (2010). 
214. See, e.g., Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 17(2).
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fairer solution) that the jurisdictional status of the carrier is determined 
by reference to the former moment.  
E) Regime for Valuables
The Athens Convention creates a separate liability regime for 
valuables. Accordingly, Article 5 of the Convention stipulates: 
The carrier shall not be liable for the loss of or damage to monies, 
negotiable securities, gold, silverware, jewellery, ornaments, works of 
art, or other valuables, except where such valuables have been 
deposited with the carrier for the agreed purpose of safe-keeping in 
which case the carrier shall be liable up to the limit provided for in 
paragraph 3 of Article 8 unless a higher limit is agreed upon in 
accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 10.215
The authors appreciate the justification for treating valuables in a 
different manner compared to other types of property, particularly in the 
light of the fact that passengers on lengthy cruise voyages might look for 
the cooperation of the carrier to protect their valuables. Yet it is evident 
that the liability regime created by Article 5 of the Athens regime is not 
entirely unproblematic. The authors wish to underscore three major 
complications. First, Article 5 is designed under the assumption that the 
passengers will be allowed by the carrier to deposit such valuables for 
safekeeping. It is not clear in the Convention what happens if the carrier 
refuses to provide a facility for the passengers depositing their valuables. 
The issue was considered, in passing, by Judge Hallgarten QC in Lee v. 
Airtours Holidays.216 He expressed the view that in such an instance a 
separate cause of action would have arisen based on an implied 
contractual claim for non-provision of safekeeping facilities.217 The 
carriers would, therefore, have been liable under this separate cause of 
action, even if not under Article 5 directly.218 The measure of damages 
would have been the amount which the claimants would have otherwise 
215. Athens Convention 2002, supra note 14, art. 5. 
216. Lee v. Airtours Holidays Ltd., [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 683 (Cent. London Cty. 
Ct.) [32] (Eng.). 
217. Id. at 39–40.
218. Id. at 39.
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recovered on the assumption that the Convention applied.219 Thus, the 
passengers could have claimed indirectly what Article 5 prevented them 
from claiming. Emanating from a County Court, the judgment does not 
have a binding effect, but, nevertheless, the authors find its reasoning 
sound. Conceptually, there is no reason why Article 5 could not be the 
source of an implied contractual duty, considering that this Article 
stipulates that the carrier will only be responsible for valuables as long as 
they are deposited for safekeeping.  
Second, Article 5 of the Athens regime does not give an indication as 
to what the basis of liability of the carrier will be for valuables deposited 
for safekeeping. Would, for example, the liability of the carrier be strict 
or absolute? If the ship sinks as a result of terrorism, would the carrier be 
able to exonerate itself from liability for valuables deposited for 
safekeeping on the basis that the cause of the loss is occasioned from one 
of the exceptions stipulated in Article 3(1) of the Athens Convention?220
Or would the carrier be liable to the passenger regardless? The language 
of Article 5 does not help in unpacking this conundrum. However, it 
should be noted that for valuables deposited for safekeeping, the carrier 
has ultimate control and is expected to make use of a safe or similar 
facility that offers maximum degree of protection. Put differently, the 
care exercised for the safekeeping of such valuables is considerably 
higher than the care exercised for other types of property left in the care 
of the carrier. On that basis, the authors believe that the liability regime 
should be an absolute one with only a number of common law defences 
allowed (i.e., those allowed for common carriers): act of nature, act of 
public enemies, and fault or fraud by the passenger.221 That said, it is 
rather uncertain that the issue will be dealt with in the same manner in all 
Contracting States.  
Last but not least, it is rather debatable whether the jurisdiction 
provisions of the Athens Convention 2002, encapsulated in Article 17, 
would apply to disputes with regard to valuables. This is because the new 
version of the Article specifically stipulates that the jurisdiction 
219. Id.
220. Athens Convention 2002, supra note 14, art. 3(1). It should be noted that 
under the Convention these exceptions apply only for personal injury and death claims. 
Id. They can only be applied in this context by analogy. 
221. See Coggs v. Bernard (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 108, 112–13; 2 Ld. Raym. 
909, 910, 918–19 (Eng.).
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provisions of the Convention applies to actions concerning personal 
injury or death or loss of or damage to property (Article 3 and 4 of the 
Convention), making no reference to Article 5 of the Convention which 
sets out the liability regime for valuables.222 The travaux préparatoires
do not make it clear whether this was simply an oversight or whether it 
was intended that jurisdiction arrangements of the Athens Convention do 
not apply with regard to valuables deposited for safekeeping to enable 
parties to make alternative jurisdictional agreements. There is no 
evidence that this matter was discussed during the build-up to the Athens 
Convention 2002,223 raising the suspicion that this was simply an 
oversight; but one can also see a counter argument being put forward in a 
coherent manner.         
IV. AN ALL-INCLUSIVE PASSENGER REGIME?
The primary objective of the Athens regime is to provide a 
compensation regime for passengers travelling by sea for death and 
personal injury claims, as well as loss and damage to their luggage.224 In 
the previous Sections of this article, aspects of the regime that could 
create uncertainty in Contracting States have been deliberated and 
suggestions have been made as to how such difficulties could be 
addressed with reference to various sources, in particular to other similar 
liability regimes used in other modes of transport.225 These issues apart, it 
is fair to say that the Convention is capable of providing a sound liability 
222. Athens Convention 2002, supra note 14, art. 3–4. This represents a 
significant divergence from the Athens Convention 1974, which stresses that any action 
under the Convention would be subject to jurisdiction provisions set out in art. 17. Athens 
Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 17. 
223. See Int’l Mar. Org. Consideration of a Draft Protocol of 2002 to Amend the 
Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea, 
1974, art. 17, U.N. Doc. LEG/CONF.13/3 (Mar. 5, 2002).
224. Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, at 1 (“The States Parties to this 
Convention, HAVING RECOGNIZED the desirability of determining by agreement 
certain rules relating to the carriage of passengers and their luggage by sea; HAVE 
DECIDED to conclude a Convention for this purpose and have thereto agreed as 
follows”).
225. See supra Sections II and III.
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regime,226 which is essential not only for the protection of passengers, but 
also for the smooth operation of an international liability insurance 
regime which is invariably provided by Protection and Indemnity (P & I) 
Clubs.227
However, no State considering the ratification of either version of the 
Convention should assume that the Athens regime provides a one-stop 
legal regime for all eventualities that can adversely affect experience of 
passengers carried by sea. The issues that would fall outside the Athens 
regime will be briefly mentioned below. The analysis intends to illustrate 
the areas that states implementing the Athens Conventions into their 
system should consider to regulate in order to improve the rights of 
passengers in their legal system.       
A) Shore Excursions
On cruise ships, shore excursions—such as scuba diving, visits to 
archaeological sites, horseback riding, and parasailing—are promoted to 
passengers as they provide high profit margins for cruise liners.228 It is 
also worth noting that such tours are invariably delivered by independent 
contractors229 and cruise liners often include into the contracts provisions 
disclaiming liability for any injuries that passengers might sustain during 
a shore excursion.230
The carrier is responsible under the Athens regime for personal injury 
and death claims during the period when the passenger is on board the 
ship or in the course of embarkation and disembarkation.231 Given that 
226. Arguably, Athens Convention 2002 provides a more comprehensive system 
by requiring carriers to obtain compulsory insurance and by allowing passengers to bring 
direct action to liability insurers. Athens Convention 2002, supra note 14, art. 4bis. 
227. See id. P & I clubs are mutual insurance organisations which traditionally 
provide cover for a wide range of third party liabilities arising from the operation and use 
of the entered vessels, such as collisions, pollution, loss of life, personal injury and 
illness, wreck removal and also fines. Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Insurance, THE
AM. CLUB, http://www.american-club.com/page/protection-indemnity-insurance (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2018).
228. See, e.g., PADI, ROYAL CARIBBEAN, http://www.royalcaribbean.com/scuba.
229. Cruise liners often hold out themselves as agents of such independent 
contractors. 
230. Unfortunately, such accidents are rather common.  
231. Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 1(8). In each case, whether 
“embarkation” or “disembarkation” is completed is a question of fact. See Collins v. 
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the terms “embarkation” and “disembarkation” have not been qualified 
in any shape or form,232 it is very likely that the carrier’s responsibility 
continues during the period when the passenger disembarks from the ship 
for a shore excursion or when he embarks on the ship on the way back. 
However, it is also evident that the carrier bears no responsibility during 
the period when the passenger is off the ship engaged in a shore 
excursion. Subject to the requirements of the law that applies to the 
Lawrence [2017] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 13 (Canterbury Cty. Ct.) (Eng.). In this case, upon 
returning to shore from a fishing trip, the claimant disembarked by stepping from the boat 
onto a platform at the top of a set of free standing steps which led down onto the shingle. 
Id. The claimant stepped onto the shingle he slipped and fell, sustaining personal injury. 
Id. The judge found that the accident was caused by the claimant’s stepping onto a large 
plywood board that had been placed on the shingle at the foot of the steps. Id. It was held 
that the “disembarkation” was not completed until the claimant was established safely on 
the shingle beach. Id. The function of the plywood board was to aid the passenger’s
disembarkation down the steps onto the shingle. Id. Accordingly, it was held that the 
accident occurred while the claimant was still disembarking from the boat, hence the 
Athens Convention was applicable. The terms “embarkation” and “disembarkation” are 
the subject of extensive case law in aviation, as the carrier is liable for an accident that 
causes death or bodily injury to the passenger from the moment he/she is in the course of 
embarkation, while on board and until disembarkation from the aircraft. See generally 
SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, supra note 69, ¶¶ 720–22. Inevitably, the question of whether 
the passenger’s movement is “controlled” by the air carrier becomes crucial with a 
number of tests being devised by Courts, especially in the US, to identify this moment. 
Id. In a nutshell, cases in the US and the UK suggest that the passenger will be in the 
process of embarkation from the moment he is “called into the gate-lounge immediately 
prior to boarding . . . (even if the carrier acts through personnel employed by the 
airport).” Id. ¶ 722. Even when the passenger is subject to special assistance at the 
airport, accidents that take place while the passenger moves in the terminal building 
while waiting for the gate to open shall not be the responsibility of the air carrier. Id.
Similarly, case law in common law jurisdictions suggests that disembarkation is 
completed “once the passengers safely reach a point within the terminal.” Id. As a result, 
accidents that take place while the passenger walks on the apron towards the terminal 
building or while he/she is in the bus taking him/her from the aircraft to the terminal 
building fall into art. 17. Id. The bus might be driven by an employee of the ground-
handler, yet it will not absolve the carrier from liability towards the passenger; it might, 
though, give the carrier indemnification rights against the ground-handler. Id. At the 
same time, accidents that take place at the baggage carousel (e.g., while the passenger 
lifts her/his baggage), or while waiting for clearance from the border control authorities, 
have been held to be outside the scope of responsibility of the air carrier. Id. 
232. See Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 1(8).
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contract,233 there is no reason why the carrier could not exclude its
liability for personal injury incurred during a shore excursion. That said, 
it should be borne in mind that in some jurisdiction attempts have been 
made to hold cruise liners liable in addition to operators of shore 
excursions, on the premise that the cruise liner is in breach of the duty to 
warn of dangerous environments234 or has acted negligently in selection 
of shore excursion operators.235 The extent to which such attempts have a 
chance to succeed varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,236 but the key 
issue here is that the carrier has no liability to passengers for personal 
injury sustained during shore excursions under the Athens regime.237    
B) Misrepresentation and Discomfort on Board a Ship
The Athens regime also does not attempt to provide a legal remedy 
for passengers complaining about deceptive marketing practices. For 
example, a passenger alleging that the accommodation provided on a 
cruise is rather different than what has been advertised will need to seek 
a remedy under the law that applies to the contract;238 although 
interesting conflict of law issues could arise in cases where the ticket has 
been purchased through the Internet. Similarly, the Convention does not 
cover liability in respect of quality complaints that might arise in context 
of a cruise. Such matters need to be dealt with under the applicable 
national law.239 As discussed above, claims for misrepresentation fall into 
233. If the carriage contract is subject to English law; for example, the Consumer 
Rights Act might be relevant in this context. Consumer Rights Act 2015, c. 15 (U.K.).
234. Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1335-36 (11th Cir. 2012). 
235. Zapata v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 12-21897-Civ, 2013 WL 
1296298, at *3–4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2013). 
236. See generally Igor Volner, Forum Selection Clauses: Different Regulations 
from the Perspective of Cruise Ship Passengers, 8 EUR. J. L. REFORM 439 (2006).
237. Thomas A. Dickerson, The Cruise Passenger’s Rights and Remedies 2014: 
The COSTA CONCORDIA Disaster: One Year Later, Many More Accidents Both on 
Board Megaships and During Risky Shore Excursions, 38 TUL. MAR. L.J. 515, 532, 550 
(2014). 
238. See, e.g., Valery v. Bermuda Star Line, Inc., 532 N.Y.S.2d 965 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 
1988) (a case brought by the passenger on the basis that the cabins provided were much 
smaller than promised on marketing leaflets). 
239. In cases where the cruise forms part of a package holiday, the passengers 
could bring an action against the tour operator under the Package Regulation 1992, supra
note 97, § 15.
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the ambit of the air law conventions on the basis of the exclusivity 
principle.240 Such claims usually fail, as they do not meet the 
requirements of Article 17 of the aviation conventions, with the 
exclusivity principle prohibiting such claims from being re-litigated 
under the cloak of a domestic cause of action.241
C) Crew’s Misconduct
As far as non-shipping incidents are concerned, under the Athens 
regime the carrier is responsible for the fault or neglect of its servants242
as long as they act within the scope of their employment.243 It is not 
unlikely, particularly on cruise ships, that the passengers might be 
subjected to verbal or even sexual abuse of the crew.244 It is submitted 
that the crew involved in misconduct of that nature cannot be held to be 
acting within the scope of their employment. If so, any claim that 
passengers would bring against such crew should be dealt with outside 
the Athens regime.245 This would naturally mean that the crew facing 
such an action will not have the benefit of limitation provisions that 
appear in the Convention.246 It is also worth noting that the jurisdiction 
provisions set out in the Convention247 would be irrelevant in this 
context. In some jurisdictions outside the Athens regime, cruise liners 
have been occasionally held vicariously liable for the verbal and sexual 
misconduct of their employees.248 However, the authors believe that this 
would be beyond the Athens regime, which stresses that the carrier is 
only responsible for the actions of its employees that are within the scope 
of their employment.  
240. See supra Section III.A.
241. See id.
242. Athens Convention 2002, supra note 14, art. 3(2). The liability regime in this 
context is fault-based. Id.
243. Id. art. 3(5)(b). 
244. Dickerson, supra note 237, at 528–29. 
245. See, e.g., Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 3(3).
246. See Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 11 (clarifying that limitations 
for crew members are possible when they are acting in the course of their employment).
247. See id. art. 17. 
248. Doe v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 11-23323-CIV, 2011 WL 6727959 
(S.D. Fla., Dec. 21, 2011) (discussing how a cruise line was sued because its staff failed 
to protect the plaintiff from assault by another passenger). 
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The matter might be more convoluted in instances where a shipping 
related incident is brought about deliberately by an employee. For 
example, if a collision occurs as a result of deliberate actions of the 
master, would personal injury claims put forward by passengers be 
within the scope of the Convention? The carrier under the Athens 
Convention 2002 is strictly liable for personal injury arising from a 
shipping incident unless the incident arises from an act of war, hostilities, 
etc., or was wholly caused by an act or omission done with the intent to 
cause the incident by a third party.249 On that basis, it is submitted that 
the carrier might be liable under the Athens regime for such claims.250
D) Cancellations
Perhaps an obvious point, but it is worth noting that the Athens 
regime does not deal with losses arising as a result of cancellations, port 
skipping or unannounced itinerary changes.251 In the absence of 
legislation dealing with the matter, what happens in such instances is 
regulated by the contract or policies adopted by various cruise liners. 
V. CONCLUSION
Given that the main focus of the article is problematic aspects of the 
Athens regime, one might be forgiven for thinking that the liability 
regime created by this international instrument is far from satisfactory. 
However, this does not reflect the view of the authors. It is submitted that 
249. Athens Convention 2002, supra note 14, art. 4.
250. The position might be different for loss of or damage to cabin luggage given 
that the liability regime for such claims is fault-based. The carrier could argue that 
deliberate actions of its employees that cause the collision is outside the scope of their 
employment. See id. art. 3(2).   
251. Compare Regulation (EU) 1177/2010 of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 24 November 2010 Concerning the Rights of Passengers when Traveling by 
Sea and Inland Waterway and Amending Regulation (EC) 2006/2004, 2010 J.O. (L 334) 
1 (addressing the rights of passengers carried by sea and inland waterways in the case of 
delay or cancellation of scheduled trips), with Regulation (EC) 261/2004 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 Establishing Common Rules on 
Compensation and Assistance to Passengers in the Event of Denied Boarding of 
Cancellation of Long Delay of Flights, and Repealing Regulation (EEC) 295/91, 2004 
J.O. (46) 1 (establishing the rights of passengers in instances of denied boarding, flight 
cancellation and long delays).
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the Athens regime provides a sound liability regime not only for 
passengers but also for carriers and their liability insurers. The 
comparison between international sea and air liability conventions 
illustrates that no regime is immune from litigation, and interpretation of 
provisions of international instruments may vary from one Contracting 
State to another.252
Of course, readers might legitimately ask two questions: Why is 
ratification of the Athens convention relatively low compared to 
international air carriage regimes and why is there not much case law on 
the aspects of the Athens Convention in Contracting States? The answer 
to the first question is not straightforward, but one reason could be that 
air travel is a relatively new venture and, as indicated in Section II of this 
article, it has been viewed from the outset as a risky engagement.253 This 
led to the rapid development of legal rules attempting to provide a 
comprehensive liability regime, and states, presumably under political 
pressure, opted to be part of the set of international instruments 
developed. Sea carriers, on the other hand, have traditionally enjoyed 
freedom of contract, and even when international rules have been 
developed to regulate their carriers’ liability, financial limits of liability 
imposed by the Athens regime have been the cause of discontent and 
certainly hampered much wider acceptance of the regime throughout the 
world. For example, the limits set by the Athens Convention 1974 were 
regarded as too low by most European states, Australia, and Canada.254
To the contrary, some states in East Asia have eschewed the Athens 
Convention 1974 on the basis that the limits were too high.255
Conversely, the answer to the second question is relatively easy and 
perhaps is an indication that the Athens Convention works relatively well 
in practice. The liability insurers, usually P & I clubs, which handle 
passenger claims on behalf of carriers, operate rather efficiently within 
252. See generally KATE LEWINS, INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS BY
SEA (2016) (providing a comprehensive analysis of rules applicable in different 
jurisdictions in this area).
253. See supra Section II.
254. See Soyer, supra note 15, at 520. 
255. Id. at 539. It needs to be borne in mind that in most states in East Asia, such 
as the Philippines, sea carriage is mainly undertaken by the state and tickets are heavily 
subsidised. Id. In return, carriage contracts contain clauses exonerating the carrier from 
all liability. Id.
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the parameters set by the Athens regime; in most instances an agreement 
is reached with the claimant passenger, making it unnecessary to take the 
case to the courts.256
On a more specific level, the conclusions of the authors are: 
i) Certain aspects of the Athens regime are in need of further
clarification, especially the following: scope of the regime, definition of 
“shipping incident,” types of damages recoverable, legal position with 
regard to contribution claims, and jurisdiction provisions when the 
carrier uses agents or when the sale is concluded on the Internet. The 
solutions adopted by air liability conventions might shed light on some 
of these problems, but it is ultimately recommended that states 
considering the ratification of the Athens Conventions should address 
these issues by implementing legislation. 
ii) It should be noted that the Athens regime does not deal with all
legal matters concerning carriage of passengers by sea. To provide 
comprehensive coverage in this area, states need to consider 
supplementing the Athens regime with national legislation to deal with 
such issues as cancellations and delays.
256. See supra Section IV. Some might suggest that sea passengers might not 
always have the financial resources to pursue their claims in court, but this is rather 
doubtful given that such passengers could seek support of personal injury lawyers who 
work on a “no win no fee” basis. Also, cruise passengers are often wealthy and would 
have no difficulty in accessing legal services.
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